Censys reports MCH and Caishen kit behind poisoned script campaign
Censys reports poisoned third-party scripts delivered a card skimmer and iOS exploit chain to site visitors; check your script includes for the listed
- Published
- Ecosystem
- Websites and CMSCrypto and Web3
- Exploitation
- Yes, according to Censys, which says it observed the malicious scripts on third-party pages and sinkholed related domains; not independently verified here
What happened
According to Censys, on November 16, 2026, poisoned third-party scripts delivered a card skimmer and a cryptocurrency clipper to visitors of major websites. These claims come from a single source, a Censys research post, and I have not found independent confirmation. Censys: MCH and Caishen: supply chain poisoning pushes iOS exploits
Censys says that, based on referrers to domains it sinkholed, it can confirm that the reported impacted sites include BBC, Zoom, CNN, DoorDash, Zillow, Fox News and GitLab. Censys credits Hudson Rock with the first report on the campaign and says Amirul Cyber tracked the same injection as OPTIMJACK. Censys
Censys says Optimizely’s status page states that an unauthorized party exploited a vulnerability in its Experimentation product to add malicious JavaScript to some customer projects. According to that statement as relayed by Censys, Optimizely has fixed the vulnerability, removed the injected code and secured the affected accounts. Censys adds that reporting and its own data tie the same loader to other third-party libraries, including Kissmetrics, StorifyMe and minute-ly. Censys
Censys describes the delivered script, track.js (29 KB), as doing four things:
- Card skimmer: collects values that look like card number, expiry or CVV from forms and input fields, and sends them to /card.php.
- Cryptocurrency clipper: replaces copied crypto addresses in the clipboard with eight hardcoded wallets.
- Page-data theft: sends the page URL, up to 8,000 characters of cookies, and a screenshot of the page to /hit.php.
- iOS staging: on iPhone, iPad and touch-screen Mac user agents it loads boot.js from two payload domains. On iOS 18.6 and earlier it also embeds a hidden iframe. Censys says the chain uses the Caishen toolkit to deliver payloads related to Coruna and Darksword.
Censys says desktop visitors get the skimmer, clipper and page-data theft, and the exploit chain does not load for them. It also describes a second route, a roughly 400-byte script at webshell[.]lol/get.js with no device check, that adds a script tag for boot.js to any page that runs it. Censys
Censys links the infrastructure to a control panel titled MCH, an iOS exploit backend branded Caishen, and cryptocurrency “energy rental” storefronts. As of November 17, 2026, it says it saw the panel title on 142 web properties, the Caishen backend title on 144 and the storefront title on 55. It says staging began on November 9, 2026, that the staging and implant C2 hosts went offline on November 17, 2026, and that the operator had five new MCH panel hosts live within about a day. Censys
Not confirmed: the operator is not identified. Censys says the channel code 02111110 is the kit’s hard-coded default, shared by over a hundred deployments, so it links components to one panel but names no operator. The number of affected visitors, and whether any iOS exploit payload succeeded on a device, are not stated in the portion of the source available to me.
Am I affected?
Per Censys, you may be exposed if:
- Your site embeds scripts from Optimizely, Kissmetrics, StorifyMe or minute-ly. Censys says the injection was tied to these vendors, though Optimizely’s statement covers only its own product.
- Any of your pages load track.js from 1688360[.]cc, or a script from webshell[.]lol/get.js. Censys says it recorded track.js on at least 30 sites as of November 16.
- Your users visited the sites named above on November 16, 2026. Per Censys, iOS devices running 18.6 or earlier get an additional hidden iframe.
Censys lists these domains as part of the campaign: 1688360[.]cc, webshell[.]lol, 5vobauua3ojpklx[.]icu and eil786npto9u5bq[.]icu. Whether other deployments of the kit use different domains is not confirmed.
What to do now
- Search your pages, tag manager and third-party script configs for the domains above and for track.js, boot.js and get.js loaded from them. This step is our suggestion, based on the indicators Censys lists.
- If you use Optimizely, review your project scripts for injected code. Optimizely says, per Censys, that it has removed the injected code and secured affected accounts, but I have not seen Optimizely’s own statement.
- Block the listed domains at your DNS or web proxy while you investigate.
- If a page of yours loaded the script on or after November 16, 2026, treat card entries and session cookies from that window as potentially exposed and review them with your security team. Censys does not say which sites’ users were affected, so this scoping is our precaution, not a sourced finding.
- Watch the Censys post for updates, since it says the operator re-established infrastructure within about a day.