DownTheDRAIN macOS infostealer: SANS ISC reports Macfinger ClickFix
SANS ISC reports a Macfinger ClickFix campaign delivering the DownTheDRAIN macOS infostealer; do not paste web page commands into Terminal.
- Published
- Ecosystem
- Desktops, browsers and mobile
- Exploitation
- Yes, according to SANS ISC, a sample was distributed on 2026-11-11 and was blocked on the author’s own Mac; no victim count or wider impact is confirmed
What happened
According to a diary by Brad Duncan on the SANS Internet Storm Center, a macOS infostealer is being delivered by the “Macfinger” ClickFix campaign. The author says he nicknamed it “DownTheDRAIN” himself, based on a Huntress analysis of a sample. He says it is a nickname and not an established name for the malware. SANS ISC
SANS ISC says the example it reviewed was distributed on Wednesday, 2026-11-11. The diary describes a fake CAPTCHA page showing ClickFix instructions, which the user is told to paste into a Terminal window. The pasted command retrieves a shell script, which in turn installs the infostealer. SANS ISC
The author says the Mac mini he used, running macOS 26.7.3, blocked the malware and moved it to Trash before it could exfiltrate any sensitive data. SANS ISC
The diary quotes the Huntress analysis (a post by Andrew Brandt, dated August 2026) as saying a DRAIN function “identifies various cryptocurrency wallet addresses and can redirect the contents to a wallet controlled by the threat actor.” SANS ISC attributes this to Huntress; the Huntress post is not among the sources used here. SANS ISC
Not confirmed: the number of victims, who is behind the campaign, how many systems were infected, and whether other macOS versions block the sample. The diary reports only one blocked infection, on the author’s own machine.
Am I affected?
The diary describes the infection chain as starting with a user pasting ClickFix text into Terminal on macOS. The sample files are arm64 Mach-O executables. If nobody on your Macs has followed fake CAPTCHA instructions that involve Terminal, the diary gives no sign that you are affected. SANS ISC
SANS ISC lists these indicators (defanged as published, shown here without URL schemes):
- Fake CAPTCHA domain: quill-kraee-um2gf[.]pro
- Download requests over HTTP to host 45.150.32[.]130, with paths /37339606cba4522a?force=1 and /4be1066a49e75?force=1
- HTTP POST to host 171.22.131[.]24 on port 8133, path /api/t, which the diary says was generated 4 times before the malware was blocked
- File saved on the host: $HOME/Library/Caches/com.apple.update (SHA-256 c34cc30cb1cff5c47d77e62a3ba63e9a183989ec1ccdf7929beb1bcae0d41f23)
- Shell script (SHA-256 58e503cc2e6aacc6bdba54f40a7edebf7a5362bef0a9039769baaba8c472c4db, 5,011 bytes)
- Infostealer binary from the second download path (SHA-256 8b5026d841aa93758ec3cb55c276f84d3ec1cf459810e0d9aa5624e2776f2fcd, 35,143,984 bytes)
What to do now
- Search proxy, DNS and firewall logs for the domain and IP addresses listed above, and block them if your policy allows.
- Search Mac endpoints for the file $HOME/Library/Caches/com.apple.update and for the SHA-256 hashes listed above.
- Tell users not to paste commands from a web page or CAPTCHA prompt into Terminal. The diary’s infection chain relies on exactly that step.
- If a Mac did run such a command, treat it as potentially compromised. The sources do not give further remediation guidance, so follow your own incident response process. Because the Huntress analysis describes a function aimed at cryptocurrency wallet addresses, wallet owners may want to review their wallets.