MediumBreach / campaignMonitoring

GBHackers reports StingyBasilisk APT espionage using named pipes

GBHackers reports a new espionage group, StingyBasilisk, used named-pipe malware in one victim network; hunt for the listed indicators.

Published
Exploitation
Yes, per GBHackers reporting of activity in one victim network since at least April 2022; not independently verified

What happened

According to GBHackers, a previously unknown espionage-focused group tracked as StingyBasilisk has run covert operations against a victim network since at least April 2022 GBHackers. GBHackers says Positive Technologies’ PT ESC IR team found the intrusion in early 2026. This is a single-outlet report, and the victim has not been named. The claims below have not been independently verified. GBHackers states that the initial infection vector is unknown and that the activity cannot yet be reliably tied to any known APT group.

What GBHackers reports about the activity:

  • Lateral movement: From February 2026 the attackers reportedly moved over SMB, dropped payloads into C:\Windows\Temp and launched them with Impacket’s atexec, which uses the \pipe\atsvc named pipe to create a scheduled task. GBHackers says the task names followed a GUID-style pattern instead of Impacket’s default. It says the CunningDoor loader was first run this way on 12 February 2026 via rundll32.exe IKEYUI64.dll,ikeyUI_DlgSelectDeviceA.
  • Persistence: GBHackers says the group used COM Hijacking (T1546.015) and Time Providers (T1547.003). For COM hijacking, it reports a TreatAs registry value was set on the Network List Manager and Network Configuration objects, redirecting calls to a lookalike library, netprofmprox.dll, which it calls the SilentCOM family. For the time provider route, it reports a rogue entry under W32Time\TimeProviders pointing DllName at a malicious DLL (one example given is wgtdgr.dll), which it calls TediousLoader.
  • TediousLoader: GBHackers describes it as a network-triggered backdoor that reads the first 256 bytes of each packet, looks for a sample-specific 8-byte magic signature, and then receives an AES-256-CBC encrypted payload that runs in memory. It says no fixed C2 server is hardcoded.
  • CunningDoor: GBHackers says it uses DLL sideloading with signed SafeNet libraries (IKEYUI64.dll with iKeyAPI.dll, and eToken.dll with DLPReel.dll). It reports the shellcode uses direct system calls, Curve25519 ECDH session keys and a modified ChaCha20 for pipe traffic.
  • Fifth component: GBHackers describes HenMapCaCon.dll, a Go DLL that hosts a TLS server over the pipe \.\PIPE\ProProBitOpen, with a decoy QR-code page and a /fetch endpoint for exfiltrating files.

Not confirmed in the source: how the attackers got in, who they are, how many organizations are affected, what data was taken, and any vendor or government advisory.

Am I affected?

GBHackers reports activity in one victim network and names no other targets, so exposure for other organizations is not confirmed. The source gives no affected product versions and no CVE. The reported techniques apply to Windows hosts, so you can check for these indicators according to GBHackers:

  • Changes to TreatAs values under HKLM CLSID keys.
  • New entries under the W32Time provider registry location.
  • Task Scheduler event 106 and process-creation event 4688 showing GUID-named tasks launched over SMB.
  • rundll32 launching signed vendor DLLs from Temp.
  • SMB traffic to named pipes matching the patterns the source describes.

What to do now

The steps below are the defensive measures GBHackers lists. The source offers no patch or fixed version.

  1. Monitor TreatAs changes under HKLM CLSID keys, as GBHackers recommends GBHackers.
  2. Audit new W32Time provider entries and check that each DllName points to a legitimate library.
  3. Hunt Task Scheduler event 106 and event 4688 for GUID-style task names created over SMB.
  4. Inspect SMB traffic to named pipes that match the patterns in the report.
  5. Alert on rundll32 launching signed vendor DLLs from Temp.
  6. Consider memory scanning for the altered ChaCha20 constant the source gives (71 20 2F 78 48 3F D9 14 48 B0 13 DA 02 32 46 88), since GBHackers says it can expose payloads that never touch disk.

Sources