GhostFrame ESXi implant linked to Settra ransomware: audit ESXi access
GhostFrame is an ESXi post-exploitation framework tied to Settra ransomware; restrict root access to ESXi hosts and check for its persistence.
- Published
- Updated
- Exploitation
- Yes, Recorded Future’s Insikt Group observed GhostFrame used by TAG-218, whose activity overlaps with Settra ransomware, in the wild
Live scores
CVE-2026-0257- EPSS
- 0.956
very likely to be attacked soon - VEDAS
- 0.982
strong exploit evidence - On CISA KEV
- Yes, since 2026-05-29
- Detection rule
- No public rule yet
Thin horizontal line: the “likely exploited” threshold (EPSS 0.10, VEDAS 0.5). Shaded “no data” areas are periods when cve-scores did not publish.
What happened
Recorded Future’s Insikt Group described GhostFrame, a previously undocumented command-and-control and post-exploitation framework that runs on compromised VMware ESXi hypervisors. It gives operators one interface to run commands, manage virtual machines, pivot through internal networks and harvest credentials from hosted Windows systems (Recorded Future). GBHackers dates the Insikt report to November 10 (GBHackers).
No vulnerability is used to get in. Operators must already have root-level access to the ESXi host to deploy the implant (Recorded Future).
Implant and persistence. The built-in builder generates an ESXi implant named vmhostd-core. The analyzed sample:
- copies itself to /opt/vmhostd-core and modifies the boot script /etc/rc.local.d/local.sh;
- repeatedly disables the ESXi firewall and the execInstalledOnly control, about every five seconds, so re-enabling them by hand is quickly undone;
- runs /sbin/auto-backup.sh to keep the changes across reboots;
- renames its process to vmhostd, which resembles VMware’s legitimate vmware-hostd daemon.
Command-and-control behavior. The sample tries simultaneous TCP connections on ports 53, 2222, 3389, 4444, 8443 and 9443 and keeps the first one that succeeds. That can show up as six near-simultaneous SYN packets from one ESXi host to one destination IP address. It then loads shellcode received from the server into memory without writing it to disk, with a /bin/sh reverse shell as fallback (Recorded Future).
Capabilities.
- List VMs, change power states, and create or delete snapshots.
- Enable VNC access and relay screens through the operator’s servers.
- Expose the ESXi HTML Host Client.
- Route traffic through the host with a SOCKS5 proxy named gfsox.
- Capture later ESXi logins with a component named sdkmon, which the frontend describes as a credential interceptor.
- Extract Windows credential data with the open-source VMkatz, from VM memory snapshots or virtual disks. Credential types include NTLM hashes, WDigest credentials, Kerberos tickets, SAM and LSA secrets, and NTDS.dit data.
(Recorded Future, Cyber Security News)
Link to Settra. Insikt Group tracked a cluster it designates TAG-218, whose activity overlaps with Settra ransomware. Between late August and October 2026, TAG-218 victim-facing servers targeted VPN appliances in the US and Europe, predominantly SonicWall, Palo Alto Networks and Fortinet. Four targeted organizations were later published on the Settra leak site. On October 12, 2026, a Fortinet VPN appliance was seen beaconing to both a GhostFrame server and a MeshCentral server that Huntress had previously tied to Settra (Recorded Future).
Related flaw. Recorded Future says the activity aligns with reporting on CVE-2026-0257, an authentication bypass in Palo Alto Networks GlobalProtect that allows a VPN session without valid credentials or MFA. It also notes that Palo Alto’s updated guidance describes attackers moving from a compromised VPN appliance to the virtualization layer (Recorded Future). Cyber Security News adds that fixes for the Palo Alto flaw have been available since May 2026 (Cyber Security News). The sources do not confirm how the root access on ESXi was obtained in each case.
Open questions. Insikt Group says the evidence does not establish that GhostFrame is exclusive to Settra, and the distribution model is not confirmed. It assesses it as highly likely that other financially motivated actors will adopt GhostFrame or similar ESXi tooling (Recorded Future).
Am I affected?
- ESXi administrators: GhostFrame only matters on hosts where an attacker already has root. Exposure depends on who can reach your ESXi management interfaces and whether root credentials or access paths have been compromised.
- Organizations running SonicWall, Palo Alto Networks or Fortinet VPN appliances: these were the products TAG-218 targeted (Recorded Future). Whether your specific devices are affected is not confirmed by the sources.
- Indicators to look for on a host: modifications to /etc/rc.local.d/local.sh, the file /opt/vmhostd-core, a vmhostd process, the firewall or execInstalledOnly being repeatedly turned off, and bursts of six connections to one address across the ports listed above.
What to do now
- Limit ESXi management access to trusted systems and investigate unexpected root logins or changes to ESXi hosts (Recorded Future).
- Check each host for changes to /etc/rc.local.d/local.sh, the presence of /opt/vmhostd-core or a vmhostd process, and attempts to disable the firewall or set execInstalledOnly to 0. Investigate the persistence mechanism instead of only re-enabling the settings, because GhostFrame turns them off again (Recorded Future, GBHackers).
- Search network logs for one ESXi host opening near-simultaneous TCP connections to the same destination on ports 53, 2222, 3389, 4444, 8443 and 9443 (Recorded Future).
- Match against the indicators Recorded Future lists, defanged here: GhostFrame C2 45[.]158[.]196[.]81 and 45[.]158[.]196[.]141, TAG-218 MeshCentral 193[.]5[.]65[.]114, and GhostFrame SHA-256 a05eae6d07b82e2e5451a72266f21fbaf76486ef4920a820988de93e15353a10 (Recorded Future). GBHackers lists the same indicators (GBHackers).
- Patch VPN devices promptly. Cyber Security News advises this and reports that fixes for the Palo Alto flaw have been out since May 2026 (Cyber Security News).