GitGuardian reports 334,762 leaked JWTs still valid in 2.4M-token study
GitGuardian reports that 334,762 of about 2.4 million leaked JWTs were still valid; check and revoke any JWT committed to repos.
- Published
- Ecosystem
- Open sourceWebsites and CMS
- Exploitation
- No confirmed exploitation; the source reports tokens still valid at check time but does not describe any attacker use
What happened
According to GitGuardian, in a research post by guest author Florent Leroy dated 13 Nov 2026, leaked JSON Web Tokens (JWTs) are increasingly common and a signature check is a weak test of risk. GitGuardian says the number of JWTs found in public GitHub repositories doubled between 2025 and 2026 (GitGuardian).
The figures below are GitGuardian’s own claims. No independent outlet or second source confirms them:
- GitGuardian says signature checks via OIDC cover only 15% of the JWTs it detects, because they work only on asymmetrically signed tokens from services that follow the OIDC protocol.
- It says 345 attribution rules matched 86% of about 2.4 million tokens to a named service.
- It says replaying each token against its service’s own API found 334,762 tokens still valid at check time.
- It says GitGuardian now detects JWTs from 14 services and validates some of them, and that the rules and live checkers have run in production since Aug. 5.
The post also explains why a valid signature is not enough. GitGuardian says it only proves the token was signed by a key that could be fetched. It says nothing about which service issued the token, who it was issued to, or whether the token still works (GitGuardian).
Not confirmed: which services the 334,762 valid tokens belong to, when exactly the checks ran, and whether any of these tokens were abused. The source excerpt available to us is truncated, so details of the live checkers are also not confirmed. No CVE is associated with this story.
Am I affected?
The post does not describe a flaw in a specific product. It concerns tokens that have leaked, mostly in GitHub repositories, according to GitGuardian. You may be affected if:
- Your repositories, including public ones, contain strings in the JWT format: three base64url segments separated by dots.
- Those strings are id_tokens or access_tokens issued by an identity provider or a self-hosted service.
GitGuardian says the token header and payload are only encoded, not encrypted, so anyone can read the claims. Which services are covered by its detectors, beyond examples such as Google, Apple, OpenAI, AWS Cognito and Umami Analytics, is not confirmed in the excerpt.
What to do now
- Search your repositories and history for JWT-format strings. Decode the header and payload (base64url) to read
iss,audandexp, as GitGuardian demonstrates. - Check
expfirst. GitGuardian notes that verifying the signature of an expired token is pointless. - For asymmetrically signed tokens (for example RS256) from OIDC providers, you can follow the six manual steps in the post: decode, check claims, fetch
/.well-known/openid-configuration, download the JWKS and select the key bykid, rebuild the public key, and verify with openssl. Theissuerfield returned must equal the token’sissclaim. - Do not treat “Verified OK” as proof of safety or of exposure. According to GitGuardian, it shows only that the signature is genuine. Whether the token still works has to be tested against the issuing service’s own API.
- General practice, not stated in the source: if a leaked token is still accepted by its service, revoke it or end the session, and remove it from the repository.