MediumBreach / campaignMonitoring

Kaspersky reports BO Team used Log4Shell in vCenter at Russian firm

The Hacker News reports Kaspersky says BO Team used Log4Shell on a vCenter 7.0.3 server in a Russian firm; check vCenter for CVE-2021-44228.

Published
Exploitation
Yes, according to Kaspersky as reported by The Hacker News, against one unnamed Russian software developer; not independently verified

Live scores

CVE-2021-44228
EPSS
1.000
very likely to be attacked soon
VEDAS
0.997
strong exploit evidence
On CISA KEV
Yes, since 2021-12-10
Detection rule
Nuclei · Suricata
EPSS (chance of attack)
10No cve-scores data 2026-02-22 to 2026-08-08no data0.1CVE-2021-44228 EPSS over time2025-042026-11-17
VEDAS (exploit evidence)
10No cve-scores data 2026-02-22 to 2026-08-08no data0.5CVE-2021-44228 VEDAS over time2025-042026-11-17

Thin horizontal line: the “likely exploited” threshold (EPSS 0.10, VEDAS 0.5). Shaded “no data” areas are periods when cve-scores did not publish.

What happened

The Hacker News reports that Kaspersky’s ICS CERT team documented a months-long intrusion at a Russian software developer, and that Kaspersky attributes it to a threat actor called BO Team (also known as Black Owl, Hoody Hyena and Lifting Zmiy). According to The Hacker News, the affected company contacted Kaspersky in June 2025 and has not been named. Kaspersky says it develops software with a “customer base in the Russian Federation”. This is a single-outlet account of a vendor report, and the attribution is Kaspersky’s assessment, not independently verified here.

According to Kaspersky, as relayed by The Hacker News:

  • Entry and discovery: The attackers compromised a Linux terminal server through an exposed SSH service and used it to scan the internal network. Their sign-in attempts to the vCenter web interface failed.
  • Log4Shell step: The attackers reportedly then targeted a VMware vCenter server (version 7.0.3) vulnerable to CVE-2021-44228, got a remote command line with root privileges, and connected to the hypervisor over SSH.
  • Backdoor: A shell script named “pgcache” was placed in “/etc/cron.hourly/“ on the hypervisor and ran every hour. It fetched a second script from a nofrillsdns[.]com subdomain, which downloaded the GSocket utility for remote control. Kaspersky says the backdoor activates when the attackers change a DNS record away from 127.0.0.1.
  • Spread: The report lists access to a corporate proxy, a second virtualization cluster, a GitLab virtual machine with source code repositories and its private key, an Ansible orchestration system, and the domain controller. It says the same password was used for administrator accounts in different domains.
  • Code-signing server: Kaspersky says one Windows server, used to sign compiled builds of the company’s commercial software, drew particular attacker interest. It believes BO Team may have intended a supply chain attack, but says the attackers were apparently unable to carry it out.
  • Aftermath: After access was lost, a phishing campaign aimed at employee credentials was reportedly sent toward the end of July, and it was detected and prevented.

Kaspersky says the attackers lost access thanks to rapid response measures. Whether any malicious code was injected into a released product is not confirmed in the source text, which is truncated at the end. The vendor name, the exact dates of the intrusion and the precise vCenter patch status are not confirmed.

Am I affected?

The source describes one unnamed Russian company. It does not say that other organizations were targeted with the same chain, so exposure elsewhere is not confirmed.

Relevant to this report:

  • You run VMware vCenter 7.0.3, or other systems vulnerable to CVE-2021-44228. The source does not say which builds are fixed, so fixed versions are not confirmed here.
  • You have a hypervisor with an unexpected “pgcache” script in “/etc/cron.hourly/“, or hosts that resolve nofrillsdns[.]com subdomains.
  • Your network sees traffic from 193.3.23[.]236 or 80.76.42[.]139, which Kaspersky says the activity originated from.
  • You expose SSH on terminal servers or reuse the same password for administrator accounts in different domains. The report describes an exposed SSH service as the initial foothold and the shared password as a factor in the Windows compromise.

What to do now

These steps follow the behaviors described in the report. They are not vendor patch instructions, and the source does not provide any.

  1. Check whether any vCenter or other Java-based service in your estate is vulnerable to CVE-2021-44228, and apply the vendor’s fix. Fixed versions are not confirmed in the source.
  2. Look on hypervisors for a “pgcache” script in “/etc/cron.hourly/“ and for DNS queries to nofrillsdns[.]com subdomains.
  3. Search network logs for connections to the two IP addresses above, which the source says belong to a provider in Ukraine.
  4. Review exposed SSH services on terminal servers, and check “/usr/bin/nxnode-login” for modification and “/dev/shm” for unexpected credential files, as the report describes.
  5. Ensure administrator accounts do not share passwords across domains, and rotate credentials and keys (GitLab, Ansible) if compromise is suspected.
  6. Audit the code-signing server and recent signed builds for unexpected changes, since Kaspersky says that server was of interest to the attackers.
  7. Review email security logs for password-reset style phishing that passes SPF and DKIM, which Kaspersky says happened here after a mail server key was reportedly obtained.

Sources