HighSupply chainMonitoring

Optimizely supply chain attack serves malware on BBC, Zoom, CNN sites

Malicious JavaScript was served via Optimizely Web to 178 organisations on 16 Nov 2026; audit Optimizely project JavaScript and review exposure.

Published
Updated
Fixed in
Server-side fix and removal of injected code by Optimizely (no version number published, details not confirmed beyond the vendor statement to BleepingComputer)
Exploitation
Yes, Report URI reported verified transactions to attacker wallets, about $7,040 received as of 19:25 UTC on 16 November

What happened

On 16 November 2026, attackers wrote their own code into the Project JavaScript (projectJS) field of Optimizely Web customer projects. The rest of each snippet was untouched and the file was still served from cdn.optimizely.com, Report URI reported. Report URI said it checked 1,611 distinct snippets and found 188 snippets belonging to 178 organisations infected. It says the real number is likely higher. BleepingComputer and GBHackers report the same counts, and RuntimeWire summarises the Report URI findings.

Named organisations in the Report URI list include Zoom, the BBC, CNN, Salesforce, GitLab, IKEA, HSBC, Equifax, Air France-KLM, Ledger and Peacock. BleepingComputer said it independently confirmed, using urlscan.io scans, that the malicious script loaded or attempted to load on many of these sites. GBHackers noted this points to a compromise of trusted dependencies, not confirmed breaches of each organisation’s own infrastructure.

What the injected code did. The injected loaders fetched track.js from 1688360[.]cc. There were three forms: a plain script tag, a Base64 version decoded with atob(), and a full inline copy that runs if the domain is blocked (Report URI). According to Report URI and BleepingComputer, the payload:

  • replaced cryptocurrency wallet addresses with the attacker’s;
  • skimmed card numbers, expiry dates and CVVs from accessible form fields and sent them to 1688360[.]cc/card.php;
  • collected page URLs, cookies not marked HttpOnly, and screenshots;
  • on iPhones and iPads, loaded the Coruna and DarkSword iOS exploit kits through hidden frames.

Report URI said cards entered in hosted payment iframes (such as Stripe or Adyen) were out of reach of the skimmer. It also said the kit’s own comments state that iOS 18.7.3 and later, and 26.3 and later, are patched.

Money stolen. Report URI said the attacker’s wallets had received about $7,040 as of 19:25 UTC on 16 November. BleepingComputer said some wallets were active before the attack, so the amount stolen in this campaign is hard to determine. The two outlets list slightly different transaction counts and ETH amounts for some wallets.

Cause and response. The outlets differ on how the attackers got in:

  • Report URI said it did not know how the attacker obtained write access, naming a compromised Optimizely system or a compromised credential as possibilities, and said this was not CDN cache poisoning.
  • Optimizely told BleepingComputer that an unauthorized party exploited a vulnerability in the Experimentation account signup flow to add malicious JavaScript to some customer projects.
  • Optimizely said it blocked the vulnerable path, deployed a fix, removed the injected code, ended active sessions, revoked tokens, reset access for affected accounts and notified affected customers.
  • Salesforce told BleepingComputer it was confirming Optimizely scripts were disabled across preview and production instances.

Report URI said that at 21:52 UTC only 1 of the 188 infected snippets (TalkTalk’s) still carried the code. It also said Smartsheet’s snippet was cleaned and then re-infected, which suggests the attacker still had access at that point. BleepingComputer said it remains unclear how long the vulnerability was present or how many visitors were exposed.

Related earlier activity. Hudson Rock recovered poisoned Optimizely project files and also found poisoned scripts served by Kissmetrics, StorifyMe and minute-ly that load webshell[.]lol/get.js. It lists 21 named web properties as a documented subset, not a victim count, and says each provider’s initial access mechanism is unknown. Report URI’s timeline places this earlier wave from 13 November.

Am I affected?

  • You run a site that uses Optimizely Web. Affected sites loaded snippets from cdn.optimizely.com. Report URI said some customers serve snippets from their own domains, and those were affected too because the content comes from the same Optimizely project. Your exposure depends on whether your project’s Project JavaScript was modified, which the sources do not let us determine for you: not confirmed.
  • You visited an affected site on 16 November 2026. BleepingComputer advises reviewing crypto transfers made that day, since destination addresses may have been replaced. It also advises watching card accounts if you entered card details, and checking account activity if you were logged in to sensitive services.
  • You use an iPhone or iPad. Report URI said the exploit chains target older iOS versions and that pages on iOS 18.6 or earlier reload every 60 seconds to retry the exploit. Whether any device was actually compromised is not confirmed (Hudson Rock says compromised-device numbers are unknown).
  • Hudson Rock also warns that audience size is not a count of affected visitors.

What to do now

  1. Review the Project JavaScript of every Optimizely Web project you own. Look for script loaders pointing at 1688360[.]cc or webshell[.]lol, Base64 strings decoded with atob(), and inline payloads executed through eval. A search for the plain domain will miss the Base64 variant (Report URI).
  2. Preserve any suspicious snippets as evidence, and check logs and CSP or monitoring reports for connections to 1688360[.]cc, webshell[.]lol, 5vobauua3ojpklx[.]icu and eil786npto9u5bq[.]icu (GBHackers).
  3. Monitor third-party script changes going forward. GBHackers and Report URI note that a Content Security Policy in enforcement mode can restrict malicious loading and outbound connections.
  4. Follow status.optimizely.com for updates, which Optimizely says it will publish at that address (BleepingComputer). Ask Optimizely whether your projects were among those it notified as affected.
  5. As a visitor who used an affected site on 16 November, check any crypto transfers for replaced destination addresses, monitor payment cards and contact your card issuer about suspicious activity, and update iPhones and iPads to the latest iOS or iPadOS (BleepingComputer).

Sources