Threat researchTracked by EncryptLayer intelligence

Analyzing an Illegal Android Gambling App Built with Flutter

Published by
Fortinet Blog
Published
9 Nov 2026
Indicators
14 verified

The report

FortiGuard Labs analyzes TinstaPorn, an illegal Android gambling app built with Flutter that collects phone numbers, location data, and device information…

Fortinet Blog

Read the full analysis: Analyzing an Illegal Android Gambling App Built with Flutter (Fortinet Blog).

What the report says

FortiGuard Labs (author Axelle Apvrille) analyses Android/TinstaPorn.A!tr, a recent Flutter-built Android app that poses as a clone of a famous Macau casino and is in fact an illegal online gambling platform. The report says the app uses rigged odds and a layered server infrastructure, and exfiltrates victims’ phone numbers and geolocation. The authors conclude it reflects well-planned development with a clean infrastructure and a full ecosystem, though Flutter apps are now easier to reverse-engineer than in 2024.

  • The report says TinstaPorn is not porn-related but an illegal gambling app with slots and roulette whose odds are rigged in the cybercriminals’ favor, and it pushes compulsive gambling through VIP recharges, rebate offers and referrals.
  • Infrastructure chain: the app contacts one of two hard-coded config servers (a gitee.com URL that has been taken down and a GitHub backup holding an old configuration). These return registration servers between the markers bydbikestart and bydbikeend. The app registers the device via /device/register, then reaches line configuration servers via /svrlist, which return game servers. Hard-coded fallback lists exist at each stage (six registration servers, two line configuration URLs, six game servers).
  • Game servers are cached in a local SQLite database with fields did, aes_key, api_protocol and api_host. The fastest server is chosen, the victim logs in via POST /app/login/mobile-sms to get a user token, and then enters games via /game/enter. Endpoints cover lobby, balance, bet history, recharge, withdrawal and tipping.
  • Data exfiltration: a log server (up.logupload0628[.]xyz/app/log/raw/report) receives device fingerprinting data before a game server is chosen. Geolocation (latitude, longitude, accuracy, timestamp) is posted to /loc/geo-location, and the phone number to /app/profile/modify-delivery or /bind_phone. Device info goes to /app/device/upload.
  • Game server traffic is encrypted with AES and signed with HMAC-SHA256 using the AES key as shared secret. Because the AES key is returned in cleartext by the line config servers, the authors say this serves to obfuscate content and check for errors, not to protect against a third party.
  • Flutter is hard to reverse-engineer because of specific registers, a different ABI and a lack of tooling. The report says that in 2026 tools such as r2flutter, Bytecode Studio and r2ai make this much easier. It lists Fortinet detection as Android/TinstaPorn.A!tr (SIGID: 815959) via FortiGuard Antivirus, with Web Filtering blocking the servers.

Named in the report: Android/TinstaPorn.A!tr, TinstaPorn, Flutter, Blutter, JEB, r2flutter, Bytecode Studio, r2ai.

This digest was written from the report text itself by a language model and checked by script: every number and CVE id in it appears in the report. The report is the source; read it for the full detail.

Indicators

Malware C

  • api[.]cloudfareproxy2618[.]xyz
  • api[.]testylhg24[.]online
  • hsreg[.]youkureg510[.]xyz
  • line[.]yongli250627linecfg[.]xyz
  • reg[.]alibabareg0303[.]com
  • reg[.]baidureg0621[.]xyz
  • reg[.]baidureg0627[.]xyz
  • reg[.]gitshreg611[.]xyz
  • reg[.]gptreg0706[.]xyz
  • up[.]logupload0628[.]xyz
  • www[.]game250522linecfg[.]xyz
  • www[.]tt250627linecfg[.]xyz
  • www[.]ylhg250627linecfg[.]xyz
  • zc[.]nationbj[.]com

Defanged so they cannot be clicked by mistake: replace [.] with a dot. Shared hosting and CDN addresses named in the report are left out on purpose, so blocking these does not break legitimate sites.

How this is tracked

EncryptLayer intelligence, A.R.P. Syndicate’s open threat feed, reviews each indicator against the published report before adding it (#42). This page is generated from that record and the report itself; the indicators are never rewritten.