Analysis of Operation FlashHole, a complex Lazarus Group campaign
- Published by
- Securelist
- Published
- 21 Oct 2026
- Indicators
- 1 verified
The report
An analysis of Operation FlashHole, a recent Lazarus Group campaign that uses a complex malware chain, the watering hole technique and abuse of CrossWeb EX, software used to protect financial transactions.
Read the full analysis: Analysis of Operation FlashHole, a complex Lazarus Group campaign (Securelist, in Russian).
The report is published in Russian; its title and summary here are an English translation.
What the report says
Kaspersky’s GReAT reports that the Lazarus group ran a new campaign, which the authors named Operation FlashHole, against organisations in South Korea, continuing last year’s Operation SyncHole. The report says the attackers combined spear phishing links to tailored fake websites with abuse of CrossWeb EX, security software that is mandatory in South Korea, to start a complex, reworked infection chain mixing known and new malware.
- The authors identified at least three affected organisations in South Korea, working in software development, construction and wired communications equipment manufacturing. They say the change in targeted industries compared with Operation SyncHole suggests the group is widening its range of targets.
- The report says the attackers abused CrossWeb EX rather than Cross EX as in Operation SyncHole. The parent process INISAFECrossWebEXSvc.exe belongs to INISAFE CrossWeb EX V3 version
3.4.1.2, and the spawned process ran with a high integrity level. The authors say it remains unknown exactly how CrossWeb EX was used, but the chain ends in in memory execution of malware. - The authors assess with medium to high confidence that victims received phishing emails linking to malicious sites on GitHub Pages. A GitHub account used as a control channel was created in September 2025 and first hosted a resume of a senior network equipment developer, then in January a interior design portfolio. The sites loaded external JavaScript from hxxps://javadevhouse.co[.]kr/ajax/libs/jquery/
1.7.3/jquery.min.jsand hxxps://pythonapischool[.]com/api/detach. - The report says the resume photo was likely generated by AI, citing missing EXIF metadata and unnatural texture. The authors say the lure site was probably also AI generated and then manually adjusted for specific victims.
- According to the report, after initial compromise the CrossWeb EX process launched the legitimate Windows executable fsquirt.exe, into which shellcode carrying the malicious DLL TechHub was injected. The analysed toolset also includes Cubridge, described as the orchestrator, TouchHub, which installs a service for the TouchShift loader, as well as ClientHub and LPEClient.
- The authors say the first signs of the campaign appeared in July 2025, with the new wave of attacks seen in January. They note Lazarus has abused CrossWeb EX before, in 2021 to deliver the Racket downloader and also in 2022 and 2023.
Named in the report: Lazarus, TechHub, Cubridge, TouchHub, TouchShift, ClientHub, LPEClient, Racket.
This digest was written from the report text itself by a language model and checked by script: every number and CVE id in it appears in the report. The report is the source; read it for the full detail.
Indicators
Malware C
- cubedesign[.]co[.]kr
Defanged so they cannot be clicked by mistake: replace [.] with a dot. Shared hosting and CDN addresses named in the report are left out on purpose, so blocking these does not break legitimate sites.
How this is tracked
EncryptLayer intelligence, A.R.P. Syndicate’s open threat feed, reviews each indicator against the published report before adding it (#24). This page is generated from that record and the report itself; the indicators are never rewritten.