Threat researchTracked by EncryptLayer intelligence

Operation ShadowCloud: initial infection and the GitDoor backdoor

Published by
Securelist
Published
18 Nov 2026
Indicators
none submitted

The report

In part 1 of our analysis of the recently uncovered Operation ShadowCloud, we discuss the initial infection stage, the GitDoor backdoor using GitHub as a C2, and the shellcode families it loads.

Securelist

Read the full analysis: Operation ShadowCloud: initial infection and the GitDoor backdoor (Securelist).

What the report says

Securelist (Kaspersky GReAT) reports Operation ShadowCloud, an active intrusion campaign identified in early 2026 in which a threat actor abuses the legitimate MeshAgent utility to drop two new backdoors, GraphDoor and GitDoor, that hide C2 traffic behind SharePoint, GitHub and Ably. The authors found victims in Asia and Africa, primarily in the government sector. This Part 1 covers the initial infection, the loaders and the GitDoor backdoor.

  • The authors found two separate MeshCentral Agent instances (MD5: 74b025084026d8d9a64661bf995d835b) launched inside a Taiwanese organization. The exact entry point is unknown, but evidence points to reuse of a prior infection already present on the network.
  • The agent was hard-coded to reach wss://27.102.66[.]162:443/agent.ashx. Through it the adversary dropped a legitimate binary for DLL sideloading, a malicious loader DLL and an encrypted payload file named config.ini.
  • The legitimate binaries abused for sideloading include Sandboxie Start (start.exe), a Python application binary, the OpenJDK javaw.exe and the Sysinternals zoomit.exe, which the attackers started as a Windows service. The loader DLLs were jli.dll, SbieDll.dll, python39.dll, WINMM.dll and libcef.dll.
  • Two loader types decrypt the payload and inject it into the current process’s memory. Type 1 applies Base64 decoding with a custom character set, then RC4, then an XOR mask, while Type 2 uses a straight XOR alone.
  • The Type 1 loader (jli.dll) reads config.ini using NtCreateFile/NtReadFile and uses the RtlEthernetAddressToStringA and RtlEthernetStringToAddressA APIs to transform the decrypted bytes and evade defenses.
  • GraphDoor and GitDoor use different C2 protocols but share on-demand plug-in download and in-memory shellcode injection. The actor also deploys a modified Erfrp client and Ably messaging-based plug-ins to proxy traffic, plus several shellcode families, mostly delivered as COFF binaries.

Named in the report: Operation ShadowCloud, GitDoor, GraphDoor, MeshAgent, MeshCentral, Erfrp, Ably, Sandboxie.

This digest was written from the report text itself by a language model and checked by script: every number and CVE id in it appears in the report. The report is the source; read it for the full detail.

Indicators

The report is tracked for context; no indicator from it met the bar for blocking (for example, it only names shared hosting).

How this is tracked

EncryptLayer intelligence, A.R.P. Syndicate’s open threat feed, reviews each indicator against the published report before adding it (#43). This page is generated from that record and the report itself; the indicators are never rewritten.