SANS ISC reports phishing page that collects MX records
SANS ISC reports a credential phishing page that also looks up the victim’s MX records and sends them via Telegram, so report such mail.
- Published
- Ecosystem
- Websites and CMSCloud
- Exploitation
- No CVE involved. SANS ISC says the message reached its handler inbox, but whether anyone’s credentials were stolen is not confirmed.
What happened
According to SANS ISC handler Jan Kopriva, a phishing message delivered to the ISC handler inbox over the past few weeks looked like an ordinary “your password will expire today” credential lure. It turned out to lead to a page that collected more than a password. SANS ISC
SANS ISC reports the link pointed to an HTML page hosted on Google Cloud Storage, with the recipient’s e-mail address in the URL fragment. The page showed a login form personalized with the domain of the e-mail address. It tried to use a screenshot of the recipient organization’s website as a background, retrieved through the thum.io service. SANS ISC
After removing layers of URL-encoding and JavaScript obfuscation, the author says he found a fairly typical credential-harvesting kit. According to SANS ISC, it supports multiple languages and tries to collect:
- the submitted password
- the visitor’s public IP address
- geographic location
- browser information and language
- a timestamp
The data was meant to be sent to the attacker through the Telegram Bot API. SANS ISC
The detail that caught the author’s attention was a field labeled “MX Record”. SANS ISC says the JavaScript runs a DNS-over-HTTPS query for the MX records of the victim’s e-mail domain against Google’s public DNS service (dns.google) and includes the result in the message sent with the stolen credentials. Unlike the Morphing Meerkat operation that Infoblox documented in March 2025, the author says the MX lookup here was not used to customize the phishing page. SANS ISC
What is not confirmed: SANS ISC says it is impossible to say whether the threat actor actually used the collected MX records, for further attacks or for prioritizing credentials. The author notes that MX records are public and that the benefit to the attacker would be automatic identification of the target’s e-mail infrastructure. The source names no actor, no victims and no scale. SANS ISC
Am I affected?
The source does not say who was targeted beyond the SANS ISC handler inbox, and it gives no count of recipients or victims. No CVE or software flaw is involved.
You may be exposed if users in your organization receive password-expiry style messages linking to an HTML page on the storage.googleapis.com host, where the recipient’s e-mail address follows the “#” in the URL. SANS ISC’s example path is /alx2/03/1a/we.html on that host; other kits may use different paths. SANS ISC
What to do now
- Search your mail logs for messages linking to the storage.googleapis.com host and the example path above, and quarantine matches. The path comes from SANS ISC’s example only.
- Tell users not to enter credentials on pages reached from “password will expire” messages. This is general practice, not a recommendation from the source.
- If a user may have submitted credentials, reset the password and review recent sign-in activity. This is also general practice, not from the source.
- Report the message and the hosting URL to your security team and to the hosting provider. This is general practice as well.