HighBreach / campaignMonitoring

SANSAR Linux malware hides GPU crypto mining via exposed Ray

SANSAR malware, entering via exposed Ray job agents, fakes NVIDIA GPU readings to hide mining; restrict Ray job access and verify NVML libraries.

Published
Updated
Exploitation
Yes, intrusions on three Linux GPU hosts via an unauthenticated Ray job agent were reported by Elastic Security Labs and relayed by both outlets

What happened

Elastic Security Labs tracked the activity as REF3364 and, according to Cyber Security News, published a technical analysis of SANSAR on November 12, 2026. Both outlets report that the toolkit reached three Linux GPU hosts through an exposed Ray job agent (GBHackers, Cyber Security News).

Entry point. Ray is a distributed computing framework used for AI training, inference and Python workloads. On the compromised host the Ray dashboard listened only on loopback, but the job agent was reachable externally and accepted unauthenticated job submissions (GBHackers). Both outlets give this timeline:

  • October 22: external probing.
  • October 24: an attacker-submitted job ran nvidia-smi and exported the GPU inventory.
  • October 25: a Python reverse shell was established.

The shell first ran with the privileges of the Ray session owner. The attacker then added an SSH authorized key, obtained root and staged the toolkit under /opt/vadi_ (GBHackers). Both outlets say the method of privilege escalation is not explained in the findings, so it is not confirmed.

Concealment of GPU activity. The attacker replaced libnvidia-ml.so.1 with a wrapper around NVIDIA’s genuine Management Library (NVML). The wrapper calls the real library and alters selected results before returning them (GBHackers). GPU utilization is reported as zero, temperature is randomized between 36 and 46 degrees Celsius, and power draw between 100 and 200 watts (Cyber Security News). The wrapper also filters process information, which affects tools such as nvidia-smi that rely on NVML (GBHackers). SANSAR can rebuild and reinstall the wrapper from recovered source files.

Concealment at kernel level. An ftrace-based rootkit, acpi_thermal_mgr.ko, hides configured processes, worker threads, files and socket entries. It is installed through DKMS with an initramfs loader, so it can reload at startup (GBHackers).

Mining and control. SANSAR is a Rust orchestrator that supervises publicly available miners: XMRig (renamed kurt) for CPU and SRBMiner-MULTI (renamed tilki) for GPU. Pool and wallet details come from the controller; Elastic found no hardcoded fallback (Cyber Security News). Per GBHackers, SANSAR talks to an onion controller over Tor using Arti, with Lyrebird providing obfs4 and WebTunnel transports. It has 16 incoming message types covering registration, heartbeats, interactive Bash sessions, miner configuration, output forwarding and TCP SYN traffic generation. Cyber Security News adds that its shell setup suppresses saved command history.

A separate systemd backdoor named netns looks up a controller IPv4 address through Ethereum smart-contract calls and connects over TCP port 8080. Ethereum is used for controller discovery, not as the shell transport (GBHackers).

Neither source names the actors behind REF3364, gives victim counts beyond the three hosts, or reports financial losses. These details are not confirmed.

Am I affected?

You may be affected if you run Ray on Linux GPU servers and the Ray job agent can be reached from outside your trusted network without authentication. This is the entry condition described in the sources. The sources do not say how widespread such exposure is.

A 0% GPU reading, or low temperature and power values, is not evidence that a host is clean. Both outlets say the reporting software itself may have been altered. Indicators listed across the two sources:

  • Unexpected changes to libnvidia-ml.so.1.
  • A kernel module named acpi_thermal_mgr.ko, DKMS artifacts, or boot-image modifications.
  • A /opt/vadi_ directory.
  • Processes or files named kurt and tilki.
  • A systemd service named netns.
  • An unexpected SSH authorized key.
  • Outbound connections on TCP port 8080 from the backdoor.

Cyber Security News also lists SHA-256 hashes, an onion endpoint, an Ethereum contract address and a contract selector. Both outlets’ IOC tables are the place to take the full values from. Hash values are not repeated here.

What to do now

  1. Check who can submit jobs to your Ray job agent. Elastic’s defender priorities, as relayed by Cyber Security News, start with this.
  2. Verify whether the GPU monitoring libraries, notably libnvidia-ml.so.1, have changed on your GPU hosts (same source).
  3. Do not rely on utilization, temperature or power readings alone. GBHackers advises independent visibility, because kernel and user-space reporting can both be manipulated at once.
  4. Correlate Ray job submissions, SSH authorized key changes, NVIDIA library changes, DKMS artifacts, boot-image modifications and unexpected services (GBHackers).
  5. Search for the IOCs in the Cyber Security News and GBHackers tables inside your controlled threat-intelligence tooling. The sources note that network indicators are defanged and should be re-fanged only there.
  6. Treat persistent access and kernel-level hiding as part of the investigation, not just the visible miner (Cyber Security News).

No vendor patch or fixed version is mentioned in the sources, and no CVE is assigned in them.

Update, 17 November 2026

  • Elastic says it found Turkish language comments in the rootkit’s source code, although it is not clear who is behind the operation. (thehackernews.com)
  • The miners delivered were XMRig version 6.25.0 (kurt) and SRBMiner-MULTI version 3.6.9 (tilki). (thehackernews.com)
  • SANSAR performs an anti-debugging check by reading TracerPid and exits if the value is non-zero. (thehackernews.com)
  • The acpi_thermal_mgr.ko rootkit intercepts system calls for directory listings, file access and process termination signals, and returns “No such file or directory” or “No such process” for hidden items. (thehackernews.com)
  • Elastic says the netns backdoor queries an embedded Ethereum contract (0x43eb291f56688c63c93e8a93c4591fc997cf6349) for the controller IPv4 address, then opens a reverse shell to the host and port given in the C2 response. (thehackernews.com)

Sources