HighSupply chainActive

ScreenConnect SCKit attacks on MSPs: disable RMM+ extensions now

Attackers pushed rogue ScreenConnect clients and SCKit malware to MSP endpoints; disable the RMM+ family extensions and check Run Command history.

Published
Updated
Exploitation
Yes, Huntress observed active attacks starting around 17:47 UTC on November 11, 2026, reported by BleepingComputer, SecurityWeek and The Register

Live scores

CVE-2026-84869
EPSS
0.012
some chance of attack soon
VEDAS
0.519
likely exploited
On CISA KEV
Yes, since 2026-09-11
Detection rule
No public rule yet
EPSS (chance of attack)
100.1CVE-2026-84869 EPSS over time2026-092026-11-17
VEDAS (exploit evidence)
100.5CVE-2026-84869 VEDAS over time2026-092026-11-17

Thin horizontal line: the “likely exploited” threshold (EPSS 0.10, VEDAS 0.5). Shaded “no data” areas are periods when cve-scores did not publish.

What happened

Huntress reported an active campaign against cloud-hosted ScreenConnect instances that began around 17:47 UTC on November 11, 2026. Attackers used ScreenConnect’s Run Command feature to install rogue ScreenConnect clients on managed endpoints (BleepingComputer, The Register).

Scale. The counts differ by outlet and publication time:

  • BleepingComputer’s first account cites Huntress with six compromised MSPs and 286 endpoints across 47 organizations, still rising.
  • SecurityWeek reports at least six MSPs and 288 hosts across 48 organizations, and that all 288 were hit within 90 minutes (SecurityWeek).
  • Huntress says sequential attacker-assigned tags suggest other MSPs may have been compromised earlier (BleepingComputer).

The malware. The toolkit is called SCKit. SecurityWeek describes it as providing persistent backdoor access, intercepting session cookies and self-replicating. It is designed to wait for a technician to connect to an infected endpoint, then try to infect the technician’s workstation and spread to other panels. Huntress says not all functionality was observed in the incidents and some was found by analyzing payloads. BleepingComputer reports that Huntress has not seen the technician-takeover step succeed, saying the console takeover attempt failed in every recovered host log it examined.

Initial access is not confirmed. Sources point in different directions:

  • ConnectWise confirmed unauthorized access to partner accounts and unauthorized remote-access software in customer environments. It suspects abuse of independent third-party extensions but says the initial access method remains unconfirmed (BleepingComputer).
  • ConnectWise disabled five extensions across approximately 400 partner environments as a precaution: Labtech Plus, RMM Plus, RMM+, RMM Plus Password Link and RMM+ Password Link. It says their presence alone does not establish compromise.
  • Huntress identified an authentication flaw in RMM+ versions 1.0.31 and 1.0.32. If no access key was configured, the extension accepts a blank one, so commands can run without ScreenConnect’s normal authentication and without defeating MFA. Commands reached endpoints with no corresponding login activity (The Hacker News, SecurityWeek).
  • The Register quotes ConnectWise: “we have found no evidence of a compromise of ConnectWise infrastructure or a vulnerability in ScreenConnect itself.” The Register also reports Huntress confirmed attacks on ScreenConnect versions 26.6.6.9747 and 26.7.6.9783, so running the latest release was not necessarily protective.
  • Blackpoint Cyber told The Hacker News that the recovered toolkit includes an exploit for CVE-2026-84869 (CVSS 9.9). Its testing found a fully patched ScreenConnect client blocks that payload. It also said it found no technical link between the five extensions and SCKit, and that the toolkit can hijack authenticated operator sessions, which patching does not address. The Hacker News reports CISA added CVE-2026-84869 to its KEV catalog on September 11, 2026.
  • There is no evidence of a bypass of the vendor patch for CVE-2026-84869, per The Hacker News.

Technician workstations. SCKit includes a component Blackpoint calls RelayTrap, which tries to infect the technician who connects to an infected endpoint and steal their ScreenConnect session cookies. ConnectWise says it has reports of technician workstations being compromised during interactive sessions, but these are still being confirmed (BleepingComputer).

Am I affected?

You are in scope if you operate ScreenConnect as an MSP or internal IT team, particularly if you installed any of these extensions: Labtech Plus, RMM Plus, RMM+, RMM Plus Password Link, RMM+ Password Link. ConnectWise says it has no reason to believe partners without these extensions are affected, but urges all partners to stay on heightened alert. Presence of an extension alone does not mean compromise.

Cloud partners: ConnectWise disabled the extensions where it could. On-premises partners must disable them manually. Even without the extensions, Huntress advises checking Run Command history, since earlier compromises may have gone unalerted.

Not confirmed: the initial access method, the “patient zero” machine, and how the malware spreads to a technician workstation.

What to do now

  1. Disable the five extensions listed above in on-premises ScreenConnect and do not re-enable or reinstall them until ConnectWise issues further guidance (BleepingComputer).
  2. Review authentication logs, extension installation records, administrative activity, Run Command history and Toolbox records for suspicious activity (ConnectWise guidance, via BleepingComputer).
  3. Look for rogue ScreenConnect clients and compare against published indicators. Huntress listed these domains: newnewnew.gotdns[.]org, soxnewwork.homedns[.]org, cdn007-digitaldownloads[.]com, sc.payproofkit[.]com and ns.mo7sen[.]dev, plus an installer pattern containing c=Exploited<N>. Full IOCs are in the BleepingComputer article.
  4. Do not investigate a suspected endpoint by starting an interactive ScreenConnect session. Use separate security tools instead (The Register).
  5. Remove malware and persistence before returning machines to service. Disabling extensions and resetting credentials alone may not remove unauthorized software or access already established. Huntress reported machines reinfected within minutes of leaving isolation (The Register).
  6. Keep ScreenConnect clients patched. Blackpoint says the existing patch blocks the CVE-2026-84869 payload, but protect operator sessions too, with tighter session validation and extra authentication for bulk administrative actions (The Hacker News).
  7. Watch the ConnectWise Trust Center for updates. A fixed RMM+ version is not confirmed in the sources.

Update, 14 November 2026

  • The Record reports ConnectWise later traced the malicious activity back to RMM+ specifically, after initially naming five third-party extensions, and says all customers should verify that RMM+ is disabled. (therecord.media)
  • A Huntress spokesperson told The Record that Huntress has not seen evidence of a new vulnerability, that it is unclear how the attacker got panel access, and that current telemetry points to compromised credentials or hijacked operator sessions. (therecord.media)
  • ConnectWise says the RMM+ family extensions provide an API capable of executing remote commands, protected by a passphrase the partner configures during setup. (therecord.media)
  • BleepingComputer reports CVE-2026-84869 is a client-side file-transfer flaw that ConnectWise patched in ScreenConnect version 26.6.5, and SCKit’s RelayTrap tries to push a file from the infected endpoint back to the technician’s workstation to exploit it. (bleepingcomputer.com)
  • BleepingComputer says SCKit is a collection of 16 scripts and components, and that RelayTrap is stored as C# source (RelayTrap.cs) that a PowerShell script compiles locally on the compromised device. Huntress believes RelayTrap appears to have been generated with a large language model. (bleepingcomputer.com)

Update, 18 November 2026

  • Huntress says that on November 12, 2026 it saw one MSP technician’s workstation exploited via CVE-2026-84869 to run a guest-pushed batch file, which reported to a Telegram bot, downloaded an installer from masterdarky[.]com and started a rogue ScreenConnect client pointing at the attacker’s own relay, all in about 9 seconds. (huntress.com)
  • Huntress says that on November 13 a second technician’s client ran an attacker ‘canary’ file, and that in October at least four more technicians were exposed to guest-pushed files, including a path-traversal attempt to drop Sync.bat into a technician’s Startup folder. (huntress.com)
  • Huntress says that since October 20 it has seen at least 688,000 guest ‘run file’ requests for update*.bat hit 42 MSP ScreenConnect servers from 29 IP addresses, which it describes as attackers blindly spraying servers and waiting for any technician to join. (huntress.com)
  • Huntress recommends updating every technician’s ScreenConnect host client to 26.6.5 or later now, and hunting for the host client spawning scripts from its Temp folder. (huntress.com)
  • Huntress says ConnectWise disclosed CVE-2026-84869 on September 8, 2026, and The Hacker News says CISA’s KEV deadline for federal agencies to apply fixes was September 14, 2026. (thehackernews.com)

Sources