InformationalVulnerabilityMonitoring

Stealthium reports NvRoot, NVIDIA driver root flaw (CVE-2026-47591)

Stealthium reports NvRoot, an NVIDIA driver flaw (CVE-2026-47591) that it says gives root; update to a fixed driver version.

Published
Fixed in
NVIDIA driver 610.57.04, 595.91.07 (595.44.14 on the 595.44.x line), 580.178.04, or later releases on those branches
Exploitation
No evidence of exploitation in the wild in the source; Stealthium says it built its own working exploit and has not published a proof-of-concept

Live scores

CVE-2026-47591
EPSS
0.001
low predicted chance of attack
VEDAS
0.054
little exploit evidence
On CISA KEV
Not listed
Detection rule
Out of scope (local)

What happened

According to a blog post by security firm Stealthium, it found a local privilege escalation bug in the NVIDIA driver, which it calls NvRoot and which is tracked as CVE-2026-47591. Stealthium says it built a working exploit that confirmed root and reported the bug to NVIDIA. Stealthium These are the researchers’ own claims. We have not seen an independent reproduction, and we have not reviewed NVIDIA’s bulletin directly.

Stealthium describes the cause as follows. A request to pin memory carries two permission fields, one for the CPU side and one for the GPU side. It says vulnerable drivers derive the page permission from the CPU field alone. A request marked “CPU read-only, GPU writable” would then give the GPU a writable mapping onto a read-only file’s shared cache. Stealthium says an unprivileged user could overwrite the in-memory copy of a root-owned setuid binary such as /usr/bin/su and then run it to get root. Stealthium

Stealthium says the file on disk does not change, so file-integrity checks would not see it. It also says the attack works from an unprivileged container with GPU access, and that the poisoned memory is shared with the host. Stealthium

On severity, Stealthium says NVIDIA scores the bug 7.8 High (CVSS 3.1). Stealthium’s own assessment is 9.3 Critical under CVSS 4.0, and it recommends treating the bug as Critical on multi-tenant GPU hosts. Stealthium That higher rating is the researchers’ view only, and we have not confirmed either score against an official record.

Stealthium also says the flaw is present in every open-source driver release from 515.43.04 (May 2022) until the fix, and that it likely predates open-sourcing in the closed driver too. Its timeline says NVIDIA shipped the fix on August 3, 2026 and published its security bulletin on September 30, 2026. Stealthium

Not confirmed: any exploitation outside Stealthium’s own testing, and any NVIDIA statement beyond what Stealthium relays. Stealthium says it is not publishing a proof-of-concept, so independent verification is limited.

Am I affected?

According to Stealthium, you may be if you run an NVIDIA driver on a Linux GPU host on a branch that predates the fix. Stealthium says an attacker needs a CUDA-capable NVIDIA GPU and an unprivileged local account, with no special group and no CAP_SYS_ADMIN. It says both open and proprietary builds are affected. Stealthium

Stealthium reports the following about driver branches:

  • Fixed in 610.57.04, 595.91.07 (595.44.14 on the 595.44.x line), 580.178.04, and later releases on those branches.
  • Runtime-confirmed as exploitable on 610.43.02.
  • At the time of writing, every release on the R590, R575 and R570 branches, and all of R565 and earlier, remains unpatched.

The scenario Stealthium emphasises is operators who hand GPUs to tenants or containers they do not fully trust. Stealthium

What to do now

  1. Identify the NVIDIA driver version on each GPU host and match it to its branch.
  2. Update to 610.57.04, 595.91.07 (or 595.44.14 on the 595.44.x line), or 580.178.04, or any later release on your branch. Stealthium
  3. If your branch is R590, R575, R570, R565 or earlier, Stealthium says no fixed release is available yet. Check NVIDIA’s security bulletin for current guidance, as we have not confirmed it.
  4. Stealthium says there is no practical workaround short of updating. It says a sysctl, seccomp profile or cgroup cannot close the path, because any process that can open /dev/nvidiactl reaches it. Stealthium
  5. Until you have patched, Stealthium advises not passing /dev/nvidia* through to tenants or containers you do not fully trust. Stealthium
  6. For detection, Stealthium says a request that is read-only for the CPU but writable for the GPU is the exploit’s signature, visible at the driver boundary as it arrives. It says its own product instruments the driver for this. Whether other tooling can see it is not confirmed. Stealthium

Sources