MediumVulnerabilityMonitoring

XLoader phishing uses fake purchase order DOCX and CVE-2017-11882

XLoader infostealer is delivered by purchase order phishing DOCX files that exploit CVE-2017-11882; patch Office and hunt the listed indicators.

Published
Updated
Exploitation
Yes, ASEC reports a phishing campaign in which an Equation Editor object exploiting CVE-2017-11882 runs a dropped script and ends in XLoader

Live scores

CVE-2017-11882
EPSS
0.999
very likely to be attacked soon
VEDAS
0.984
strong exploit evidence
On CISA KEV
Yes, since 2021-11-03
Detection rule
Out of scope (local)
EPSS (chance of attack)
10No cve-scores data 2026-02-22 to 2026-08-08no data0.1CVE-2017-11882 EPSS over time2025-042026-11-17
VEDAS (exploit evidence)
10No cve-scores data 2026-02-22 to 2026-08-08no data0.5CVE-2017-11882 VEDAS over time2025-042026-11-17

Thin horizontal line: the “likely exploited” threshold (EPSS 0.10, VEDAS 0.5). Shaded “no data” areas are periods when cve-scores did not publish.

What happened

The AhnLab Security Intelligence Center (ASEC) identified phishing emails disguised as requests to confirm a purchase order. The body asks the recipient to open an attached DOCX file to verify the order. ASEC The ASEC page is dated Nov 12 2026, while the headline list for this story gives 2026-11-11 for it.

According to ASEC, the infection chain works as follows:

  • The DOCX embeds a malicious RTF document that Word processes through its “Import Content from Another Document” (altChunk) feature. ASEC
  • While the RTF is processed, an OLE object creates a VBS file at %TMP%\724812.vbs. A second OLE object exploiting CVE-2017-11882, the Equation Editor flaw, runs it with CmD.exe/Ccscript %tmp%\724812.vbs. ASEC
  • The VBS file holds Base64-encoded data, saved as %TMP%\Quisque.Dal, and runs an embedded first-stage PowerShell script. Decoded, the data contains a loader, an encrypted payload and a secondary PowerShell script. ASEC
  • The first PowerShell script stores the PowerShell path in the TORO value under HKCU\Environment and itself in the Laboris value under HKCU\SOFTWARE\AppDataLow. It then adds a Cupidatat value under the Run key so it executes at logon. ASEC
  • The loader decrypts the payload with XOR (key 0X6B506102) and runs it in memory. The final malware is XLoader, an infostealer, with version information showing 8.9. It steals PC details and browser data and can download additional malware. ASEC

Cyber Security News adds that the sample email presented an order worth $144,744.50, and that the report does not name a threat actor, say how many organizations received the emails, or confirm how many systems were compromised. Cyber Security News GBHackers notes the documented chain relies on exploiting a vulnerable component rather than on an Office macro. It also says an earlier ASEC investigation of purchase confirmation emails used the same Equation Editor vulnerability, but that this does not establish the same operator ran both campaigns. GBHackers

Fixed versions and specific affected Office builds are not confirmed in the sources.

Am I affected?

You may be if both of these apply:

  • Users on Windows can receive external email with DOCX attachments.
  • Their Office installation still contains the vulnerable Equation Editor component. GBHackers says the chain runs in a vulnerable Office environment and advises removing vulnerable Equation Editor installations. GBHackers Which builds are vulnerable is not confirmed.

Indicators published by ASEC:

  • MD5: 5bd3c5f273ba5ae4c4ae745c6943a4f7, 8b3542531d98a47524c0f468d0158996, e0d7a34bc9f4590bc073d08b50c854d1
  • C2 address (defanged, scheme omitted): www[.]dumbsplash[.]com/ilto/ ASEC

Cyber Security News also lists the following. These items are not in ASEC’s own published text:

  • Attachment name PORD051071.docx and embedded RTF efo.rtf
  • A fourth MD5, 56cc0734f9bf2eecf8ba5b9a5fb8a25f, labelled “Equation object” Cyber Security News

What to do now

  1. Apply Office security updates and remove vulnerable Equation Editor installations. GBHackers
  2. Search mail and endpoint logs for the MD5 hashes above and for connections to the C2 address (defanged above).
  3. Hunt for the host artifacts: %TMP%\724812.vbs, %TMP%\Quisque.Dal, and the registry values TORO, Laboris and Cupidatat in the locations listed above. Correlate the Run entry with the other registry values instead of treating each as an isolated artifact. GBHackers
  4. Look for Word spawning script execution (the document-to-script transition) followed by registry changes and logon persistence. Cyber Security News
  5. Tell staff to verify unexpected purchase orders through a known contact and to check sender domains and attachment extensions (.exe, .vbs, .js) before opening anything. ASEC
  6. If a system opened the attachment and shows these artifacts, treat it as a possible infostealer infection. XLoader can steal browser data, so assess what credentials were stored in the browser. The sources do not give further remediation guidance.

Sources