CVE-2026-114611: OCO-Server: MDM /profile endpoint accepts self-signed PKCS#7 signatures (PKCS7_NOVERIFY): device MDM identity (certificate + private key) disclosure and device-record hijack
Advisory generated from the CVE record, CISA, Exploit Observer and VEDAS: what it is, whether it is exploited, who is affected, and how to fix and detect it.
Generated by VEDAS. Scores as of 2026-11-04 15:41 UTC. Rebuilt every few hours from cve-scores, CISA KEV and vedas-signatures. How this works and its limits.
What it is
OCO-Server is a self-hosted endpoint management application for computer inventory, software deployment, and mobile device management. Prior to 1.2.3,the Apple MDM enrollment endpoint `frontend/api-mdm.php` verifies the signed enrollment-request plist with `openssl_pkcs7_verify(..., PKCS7_NOVERIFY, ...)`. `PKCS7_NOVERIFY` disables signer certificate chain and trust validation, so the signature only has to be self-consistent with whatever certificate is embedded in the PKCS#7 blob. A self-signed certificate from an unrelated attacker is accepted. Because the endpoint trusts the `SERIAL` field taken from the unverified payload, anyone who knows a registered device’s serial number can sign a forged plist (`SERIAL` = victim device, attacker-chosen `UDID`) with an arbitrary self-signed certificate; POST it unauthenticated to `/api-mdm.php/profile` (Content-Type: `application/pkcs7-signature`); and receive the victim device’s freshly minted MDM identity: a certificate with `CN=<serial>` issued by the server’s internal MDM device CA, bundled with its private key in a PKCS#12 payload inside the returned `.mobileconfig` enrollment profile. Additionally, the victim’s `mobile_device` database row is silently overwritten with the attacker-supplied `UDID` (device-record hijack). With the stolen certificate and key, the attacker can impersonate the victim device on all subsequent MDM traffic (`/checkin`, `/mdm`, `/parameters`), which authenticate callers by the certificate CN (the serial number) via `checkSignature()` in the same file. This yields control over the victim device’s MDM relationship: reading its management data, replacing its push token, and disrupting or redirecting its enrollment. Version 1.2.3 fixes the issue.
Description quoted from the CVE record (assigned by GitHub_M, published 2026-10-22).
Weakness: CWE-295: Improper Certificate Validation
How it can be exploited
Exploitable over the network with low attack complexity needing no privileges and no user interaction. Impact: confidentiality high, integrity high, availability none. CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N
CISA assessment (SSVC): CISA assesses that a public proof of concept exists. Automatable: yes. Technical impact: total.
Public exploit evidence (Exploit Observer)
Exploit Observer found 3 code repositories naming this CVE.
Code repositories that name a CVE are often scanners, copies or fakes, and some are malware. Read the code before running anything.
See all 4 references on Exploit Observer
Live scores
- EPSS
- 0.003
low predicted chance of attack - VEDAS
- 0.986
strong exploit evidence - On CISA KEV
- Not listed
- Detection rule
- Suricata
Who is affected
| Product | Affected | Not affected |
|---|---|---|
| schorschii OCO-Server | version < 1.2.3 | Not stated |
Version ranges exactly as the CVE record states them. “Before X” means X is the first fixed version.
How to fix it
No fixed version or vendor advisory is listed in the CVE record yet. Watch the vendor’s security page.
How to detect it
Suricata rules (network detection)
1 rule that alert on traffic matching this exploit: VEDAS CVE-2026-114611 OCO-Server Apple MDM Enrollment - PKCS7 Signature Verification Bypass. Add them to your Suricata rule set and reload.
Show the rules
alert http $EXTERNAL_NET any -> $HTTP_SERVERS $HTTP_PORTS (msg:"VEDAS CVE-2026-114611 OCO-Server Apple MDM Enrollment - PKCS7 Signature Verification Bypass"; flow:established,to_server; http.method; content:"POST"; http.uri; content:"api-mdm.php/profile"; nocase; fast_pattern; http.content_type; content:"application/pkcs7-signature"; nocase; classtype:web-application-attack; reference:cve,CVE-2026-114611; reference:url,https://www.exploit.observer/?keyword=CVE-2026-114611&match=exact; reference:url,https://subdomain.center/?engine=ammonites&keyword=oco-server&match=exact; sid:1085400; rev:1;)
CVE-2026-114611.rules on GitHub
References
Other references
- https://github.com/schorschii/OCO-Server/security/advisories/GHSA-p549-5h7r-7639 (x_refsource_CONFIRM)
- https://github.com/schorschii/OCO-Server/commit/5cab5ad2461434816d706b7be9cc08bda15c1404 (x_refsource_MISC)
- https://github.com/schorschii/OCO-Server/commit/f3a6591136f9bd92aff39ddfb26587e6dfdb64df (x_refsource_MISC)
Other databases
Where this comes from
This advisory is generated automatically by VEDAS from: CVE.org record, cve-scores (EPSS and VEDAS), Exploit Observer, vedas-signatures. Text in quotes is reproduced from the source; everything else is a fixed template filled with source fields. Nothing here is written by a language model. Check the vendor advisory before acting, and read how VEDAS and Exploit Observer work, and their limits.
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