CVE-2026-117565: Artalk before 2.10.1 Unauthenticated SSRF via Comment Page Title Fetch
Advisory generated from the CVE record, CISA, Exploit Observer and VEDAS: what it is, whether it is exploited, who is affected, and how to fix and detect it.
Generated by VEDAS. Scores as of 2026-11-01 19:19 UTC. Rebuilt every few hours from cve-scores, CISA KEV and vedas-signatures. How this works and its limits.
What it is
Artalk before 2.10.1 contains an unauthenticated server-side request forgery vulnerability that allows remote attackers to make the server fetch arbitrary URLs by submitting anonymous comments to /api/v2/comments. Attackers can set a page_key to an internal URL, which GetTitleByURL fetches after only scheme validation, then read the page title through the public comment list.
Description quoted from the CVE record (assigned by VulnCheck, published 2026-10-27).
Weakness: Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF)
How it can be exploited
Exploitable over the network with low attack complexity with no special attack requirements needing no privileges and no user interaction. Impact: confidentiality low, integrity none, availability none. CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:L/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N
Public exploit evidence (Exploit Observer)
Also known as: GHSA-m4rh-857p-qh9p
VEDAS cluster: VEDAS:DOWNPOURDIME
Exploit Observer links 5 pieces of public exploit code or detection modules that name this CVE or one of its aliases.
Exploit code and modules (5)
Code that names this CVE. A repository can be a working exploit, a scanner, a fake or malware; read it before running anything.
- Code repository: https://raw.githubusercontent.com/ARPSyndicate/vedas-signatures/main/nuclei/2026/CVE-2026-117565.yaml
- Code repository: https://raw.githubusercontent.com/ARPSyndicate/vedas-signatures/main/nuclei/2026/CVE-2026-117565.yaml
- Code repository: https://raw.githubusercontent.com/ARPSyndicate/vedas-signatures/main/suricata/2026/CVE-2026-117565.rules
- Code repository: https://raw.githubusercontent.com/ARPSyndicate/vedas-signatures/main/suricata/2026/CVE-2026-117565.rules
- Code repository: https://raw.githubusercontent.com/ARPSyndicate/vedas-signatures/main/suricata/2026/CVE-2026-117565.rules
Vulnerability databases and vendor advisories (2)
Catalogue entries, not exploit evidence.
- Vulnerability database or vendor advisory: https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-m4rh-857p-qh9p
- Vulnerability database or vendor advisory: https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-117565
3 more references returned by Exploit Observer did not name this CVE or an alias, so they are left out.
VEDAS data as of 2026-11-01T17:12 UTC; fetched 2026-11-02.
Live scores
- EPSS
- 0.004
low predicted chance of attack - VEDAS
- 0.989
strong exploit evidence - On CISA KEV
- Not listed
Who is affected
| Product | Affected | Not affected |
|---|---|---|
| ArtalkJS Artalk | before 2.10.1 | Not stated |
Version ranges exactly as the CVE record states them. “Before X” means X is the first fixed version.
How to fix it
Fixed versions stated in the CVE record: 2.10.1.
Vendor guidance:
- https://github.com/ArtalkJS/Artalk/commit/dae6bf49c9efec755a5b3ac3e379b4004c29a049 (patch)
- Artalk v2.10.1 Release Notes (release-notes)
How to detect it
Nuclei template (active check)
Artalk - Unauthenticated Server-Side Request Forgery
Artalk before 2.10.1 contains an unauthenticated server-side request forgery in its comment API. An anonymous POST /api/v2/comments whose page_key is a URL causes the server to fetch that URL via GetTitleByURL (internal/dao/service.go), which only validates the scheme before calling http.Get, so an attacker can make the server request arbitrary internal or external URLs. This template submits an anonymous comment whose page_key points at a unique out-of-band collaborator URL and confirms the vulnerability when the Artalk server performs the resulting DNS/HTTP request to that collaborator.
Name and description quoted from the template, written by VEDAS.
The template sends 1 request (POST /api/v2/comments); it confirms through an out-of-band callback (interactsh), so the scanner must be able to receive it; it decides using word matchers. Severity in the template: medium. Marked as not yet verified against a live vulnerable target.
Run it against a host you own or are authorised to test:
nuclei -u https://your-host -t CVE-2026-117565.yamlShow the template (43 lines)
id: CVE-2026-117565
info:
name: "Artalk - Unauthenticated Server-Side Request Forgery"
author: vedas-arpsyndicate
severity: medium
description: |
Artalk before 2.10.1 contains an unauthenticated server-side request forgery
in its comment API. An anonymous POST /api/v2/comments whose page_key is a URL
causes the server to fetch that URL via GetTitleByURL (internal/dao/service.go),
which only validates the scheme before calling http.Get, so an attacker can make
the server request arbitrary internal or external URLs. This template submits an
anonymous comment whose page_key points at a unique out-of-band collaborator URL
and confirms the vulnerability when the Artalk server performs the resulting
DNS/HTTP request to that collaborator.
reference:
- https://www.exploit.observer/?keyword=CVE-2026-117565&match=exact
- https://subdomain.center/?engine=ammonites&keyword=artalk&match=exact
classification:
cvss-metrics: CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N
cvss-score: 5.3
cve-id: CVE-2026-117565
cwe-id: CWE-918
metadata:
verified: false
tags: cve,cve2026,artalk,ssrf,oob,unauth
http:
- raw:
- |
POST /api/v2/comments HTTP/1.1
Host: {{Hostname}}
Content-Type: application/json
{"name":"vedas","email":"vedas@example.com","content":"vedas-ssrf-probe","page_key":"http://{{interactsh-url}}/","page_title":"vedas","site_name":"","link":""}
matchers-condition: and
matchers:
- type: word
part: interactsh_protocol
words:
- "http"
- "dns"
condition: or
CVE-2026-117565.yaml on GitHub
Suricata rules (network detection)
1 rule that alert on traffic matching this exploit: VEDAS CVE-2026-117565 Artalk - Unauthenticated SSRF via comment page_key. Add them to your Suricata rule set and reload.
Show the rules
alert http $EXTERNAL_NET any -> $HTTP_SERVERS $HTTP_PORTS (msg:"VEDAS CVE-2026-117565 Artalk - Unauthenticated SSRF via comment page_key"; flow:established,to_server; http.method; content:"POST"; http.uri; content:"/api/v2/comments"; nocase; fast_pattern; http.request_body; content:"\"page_key\""; nocase; pcre:"/\"page_key\"\s*\x3a\s*\"https?\x3a\/\//i"; classtype:web-application-attack; reference:cve,CVE-2026-117565; reference:url,https://www.exploit.observer/?keyword=CVE-2026-117565&match=exact; reference:url,https://subdomain.center/?engine=ammonites&keyword=artalk&match=exact; sid:1090000; rev:1;)
CVE-2026-117565.rules on GitHub
References
Vendor advisories and patches
- https://github.com/ArtalkJS/Artalk/commit/dae6bf49c9efec755a5b3ac3e379b4004c29a049 (patch)
- Artalk v2.10.1 Release Notes (release-notes)
Exploits and technical analysis
- GitHub Issue #1199 (issue-tracking)
- https://github.com/ArtalkJS/Artalk/blob/v2.10.0/internal/dao/service.go#L96-L103 (technical-description)
- VulnCheck Advisory: Artalk before 2.10.1 Unauthenticated SSRF via Comment Page Title Fetch (third-party-advisory)
Other references
- https://github.com/ArtalkJS/Artalk (product)
Other databases
Where this comes from
This advisory is generated automatically by VEDAS from: CVE.org record, cve-scores (EPSS and VEDAS), Exploit Observer, vedas-signatures. Text in quotes is reproduced from the source; everything else is a fixed template filled with source fields. Nothing here is written by a language model. Check the vendor advisory before acting, and read how VEDAS and Exploit Observer work, and their limits.