Bitrise discloses CI platform incident: rotate secrets, reconnect GitHub
Bitrise says an attacker accessed its internal CI systems and files in 15 customer workspaces; it advises rotating stored secrets.
- Published
- Exploitation
- Yes, according to Bitrise’s own disclosure; no independent verification, and the investigation is still open
What happened
According to Bitrise’s own blog post, the company detected suspicious activity on November 13 involving a bot account that had access to an internal system running CI builds for build steps. Bitrise says it turned off the whole platform four hours later and that most services are now back to normal (Bitrise Blog: The Bitrise security incident, preliminary review and recommended steps). The post’s headline describes the incident as pentest-labelled recon, a bot account without 2FA, and credentials used within minutes (Bitrise headline, 2026-11-18). These are Bitrise’s statements. No independent outlet or third party has confirmed them.
Bitrise says it linked the attacker to scanning and probing between October 25 and 27, 2026. In that period the actor reportedly scanned more than 20 Bitrise hostnames and registered test accounts with disposable email addresses. Bitrise says some tools described themselves as authorized penetration tests or security research, but that the attacker supplied those labels without authorization. It also says the attacker used a customer’s public pentest application to blend in with legitimate scanning (Bitrise Blog).
Bitrise says that on November 12 at 14:00 UTC the attacker created a new account and ran builds with its own scripts against a public placeholder repository. According to Bitrise, those scripts probed the build environment for credentials and used them to test for cross-account listing, and those requests were refused (Bitrise Blog). The blog text available to us is cut off after this point, so the full entry path is not confirmed here.
On what was accessed, Bitrise says:
- Most of it was Bitrise’s own: internal credentials, some of its repositories, and operational records such as infrastructure configuration and build machine logs.
- Some of Bitrise’s own secrets, unrelated to customers, were taken from its CI workflows.
- Files in 15 customer workspaces were accessed without authorization: 1 code-signing certificate file, 1 provisioning profile, and 13 diagnostic build logs from May 2026.
- Bitrise says the attacker could not access the certificate’s password, which is stored in the secret manager.
- One log contained a credential and another an email address.
- All 15 customers were contacted (Bitrise Blog).
Bitrise says it found no indication that customer secret stores were accessed. It is still waiting for GitHub audit logs to correlate with its own before moving to a final report (Bitrise Blog).
Bitrise also published a preliminary technical advisory, marked TLP:CLEAR, with an activity window of 2026-10-25 to 2026-11-14 UTC. It says counts, times and indicators may change, and that it is not a complete incident report or a determination of impact on any individual organization (Bitrise: attacker behaviour, indicators and monitors).
Am I affected?
Only Bitrise can say for certain. Based on Bitrise’s own account:
- Bitrise says the 15 affected customer workspaces were contacted directly. If you were not contacted, Bitrise says its file-level analysis found no evidence of your secrets, code-signing files, build artifacts or source code in what the attacker accessed.
- Bitrise says it still recommends rotating stored secrets “out of an abundance of caution”.
- On November 13, Bitrise replaced the private key of the Bitrise GitHub App and revoked all user authorizations for it. It also revoked every access token issued by the Bitrise GitHub OAuth app and rotated its client secret. If you connect through GitHub, expect to have been disconnected.
- GitHub automatically removed any SSH deploy keys that Bitrise had added to your repositories through the revoked OAuth tokens. Keys you added yourself were not affected.
All of this comes from Bitrise Blog. Whether any customer secret was in fact exposed is not independently confirmed.
What to do now
- Rotate secrets, tokens and certificates stored in Bitrise, and the Git credentials connected to it. Bitrise says they are under Workflow Editor > Secrets and Workspace settings > Shared resources. Bitrise released a Protected Secret Masked Review that shows the last 4 characters of a value to help you identify it. It does not rotate anything (Bitrise Blog).
- If your projects use the Bitrise GitHub App, authorize it again. Bitrise says enabling GitHub Checks or linking repositories may fail with a 422 error until you do.
- If your projects use the GitHub OAuth connection, reconnect your GitHub account in Bitrise.
- If a build cannot clone your repository over SSH, re-add the Bitrise deploy key under the repository’s Settings > Deploy keys in GitHub, and re-add the project’s SSH key in Bitrise after reconnecting.
- As a general practice Bitrise mentions, review your public install pages, which allow download without signing in by design, and turn off any you no longer need.
- Optionally, search your own logs using the indicators Bitrise published. It provides a CSV file (bitrise-incident-public-iocs.csv, 48 rows) and a STIX 2.1 file (bitrise-incident-public-stix21.json), plus a MITRE ATT&CK mapping. Its main addresses are 74.211.97.67, 118.100.234.120 and 95.40.73.129, and it notes that two of the three are cloud or subscriber addresses that get reassigned, so matches outside the seen windows mean little. It also lists user agent strings that describe themselves as authorized pentests. Check hits against your own contracted testing, and treat the “correlate” and “context” indicators as supporting detail only (Bitrise: attacker behaviour, indicators and monitors).
- Watch for updates. Bitrise says each revision of its advisory carries a new version number and that the investigation is not closed.