wfx-loot GitHub CI secret stealer hits tens of thousands of repos
A stolen-token campaign pushed a CI secret stealer into GitHub repos from Nov 10; check for wfx-docs branches and rotate exposed secrets.
- Published
- Updated
- Exploitation
- Yes, Aikido reports the payload ran in at least 1,806 repositories and credentials were likely collected
What happened
Starting on November 10, 2026, an attacker used stolen GitHub credentials to push a secret stealer into repositories those credentials could write to, according to Aikido. Aikido tracks the campaign as wfx-loot. It counted 4,837 compromised accounts that opened probe pull requests in 61,764 repositories. It found indications that the payload ran in at least 1,806 repositories, and says this may understate the impact. The same Aikido post also cites “at least 1,835” in one passage, so the exact figure is not settled. The Hacker News reports the same Aikido findings.
Separately, SafeDep counted 8,093 repositories that received malicious commits between November 10 at 12:46 UTC and November 12 at 04:36 UTC. The Hacker News notes that this count covers every repository that received malicious commits, not only those where the stealer ran. It also says the search covered only default branches of public repositories.
The sequence, as described by the researchers:
- Probe: the attacker opens a pull request titled “docs: dependency audit notes” from a branch named wfx-docs to confirm write access. Aikido says an account that opened one is compromised even if the workflow stage did not run.
- Payload: a shell script of about 1,500 lines is pushed in one of several ways. Aikido lists three: a workflow injection (commit “ci: refresh build cache”), an npm postinstall hook (commit “chore: add ci helper”) and a throwaway-branch workflow (commit “chore: add dependency audit workflow”). StepSecurity adds a fourth: appending the script to an existing shell script that CI already runs, such as update.sh.
- Cleanup: the attacker reverts the change and deletes the workflow run and its logs. Aikido and Help Net Security say this happens within a minute. A correction on The Hacker News says a second analysis found changes left in place for longer. A missing run number in the workflow history is often the only trace.
According to StepSecurity, the attacker does not exploit a bug in GitHub Actions and instead uses valid tokens for developer and bot accounts. StepSecurity traced 173 probe pull requests, from 19 accounts, to tokens issued to the Fly.io GitHub App. It says it has not established how the tokens were obtained and has no evidence of a breach of Fly.io’s own infrastructure. SecurityWeek reports the same. Aikido’s analysis does not explain how the credentials were obtained.
What the stealer collects and does, per Aikido:
- Collects: Actions secrets and variables, the workflow GITHUB_TOKEN, OIDC and Actions runtime tokens, credential files for AWS, Azure, GCP, Docker, Kubernetes, npm, PyPI, SSH and others, AI provider keys, and secrets from runner process memory.
- Escalates: it exchanges OIDC tokens for AWS, GCP and Azure sessions and can create long-lived AWS access keys.
- Persists: it can rewrite an AWS role trust policy to allow any AWS account and add federated identity credentials named wfx-ci-... to Azure AD applications. These survive token rotation.
- Exfiltrates: Aikido’s deployed configuration used HTTP POST to 194.150.166[.]244:8080/exfil or 18.143.168[.]96:8080/exfil. SafeDep also lists 153.75.82[.]159 and a Telegram chat. StepSecurity reports that from about 05:30 UTC on November 12 new copies sent data only to Telegram, so blocking the published IPs no longer stops it.
Package impact, as reported:
- Packagist: digitalelvis/neuronai-studio v3.14.3 is malicious. SafeDep says a normal composer install does not run the payload, but running npm install inside the package’s vendor directory does.
- Go, docker-env/redock: github.com/onuragtas/docker-env v1.0.278 and v1.0.280 carry the payload only in a workflow file, which Go builds never run. SafeDep also lists v1.0.282 and notes the module was renamed redock.
- Go, gocurl: per The Hacker News and SafeDep, github.com/vkuznet/gocurl pseudo-version v0.0.0-20261111095532-8d5aad0cb0da carries it in a workflow that has never run.
- WebdriverIO: 28 repositories received commits authored as the bot account wdio-bot, with no package release affected, per StepSecurity and The Hacker News.
Aikido says the attacker appears to target CI secrets rather than to spread through the supply chain. Aikido also found an overlap with accounts hit in October’s GhostAction campaign, but says it does not attribute November to the same actor, per The Hacker News and Help Net Security.
Counts differ between outlets. Probe pull request totals are 61,839 for Aikido, 61,879 for SafeDep and more than 63,000 for StepSecurity as of 07:40 UTC on November 12. The campaign was still producing new pull requests when these were written.
Am I affected?
You may be affected if any of the following appeared in a repository you can write to on or after November 10, 2026 (Aikido, The Hacker News):
- A wfx-docs branch, or a pull request titled “docs: dependency audit notes”.
- Commits titled “ci: refresh build cache”, “chore: add ci helper”, “chore: add dependency audit workflow”, “ci: restore” or “ci: cleanup”.
- Short-lived branches named chore/ followed by eight random characters, or ci-check- followed by four digits.
- A missing run number in the Actions history next to one of those commits. StepSecurity says this probably means the stealer ran and the run was deleted.
- A machine that ran npm install on an affected commit, or that installed or opened digitalelvis/neuronai-studio v3.14.3.
Absence of wfx-loot artifacts, wfx- cache entries or WFX-BEGIN step summaries does not show data was safe, per Aikido. The Hacker News reports that the stealer has settings for private repositories, which the company says suggests it may be running in them. The published counts cover only public repositories. Whether any specific private repository was hit is not confirmed.
Consumers of the Go modules may not have been affected, since Go builds do not run workflow files (SafeDep). The sources still recommend blocking the listed versions.
What to do now
- Search repositories you can write to for the branch names, pull request title and commit messages listed above, and check the Actions tab for gaps in run numbers after those commits.
- If you opened or received a probe pull request, treat the account that opened it as compromised. The Hacker News reports SafeDep’s advice: revoke the commit author’s tokens, OAuth app grants, SSH keys and sessions, and turn on 2FA.
- If the payload may have run, rotate every secret and variable the repository can read, and treat every cloud role available to its workflows as compromised (Aikido).
- Look for persistence that survives rotation, using the checks The Hacker News attributes to SafeDep:
- Entra ID: federated credentials named wfx-ci-* that you did not create.
- AWS CloudTrail: AssumeRoleWithWebIdentity or AssumeRole sessions named wfx-*, followed by CreateAccessKey or UpdateAssumeRolePolicy.
- GCP: GenerateAccessToken and SignJwt calls from your GitHub workload identity pool.
- Vault: JWT logins from the GitHub OIDC issuer.
Also review AWS role trust policies for a Principal of AWS “*” (Aikido).
- Remove or block the packages: pin digitalelvis/neuronai-studio to v3.14.2 or earlier (SafeDep); block docker-env/redock v1.0.278, v1.0.280 and v1.0.282, and the gocurl pseudo-version above.
- Treat any machine that ran npm install on an affected commit as compromised and rotate its keys (The Hacker News).
- Review bot and automation accounts with write or branch-protection bypass rights. StepSecurity reports that the token used in the WebdriverIO and drunomics repositories belonged to a bot, and says automation accounts with write access, especially with bypass rights, are as valuable to this attacker as maintainers. The Hacker News says the token of the WebdriverIO bot wdio-bot should be treated as stolen.
- Do not rely on blocking the published IP addresses alone, since later copies reported by StepSecurity send data only to Telegram.
Update, 15 November 2026
- Endor Labs says it found payload evidence in 8,926 GitHub repositories as of its 12 Nov 2026 21h35 UTC update, including more than 829 with post-install hooks added to package.json. It also reports nextcloud/docker (7,429 stars) among the victims and says appseed-projects5 (272 repositories) and appseed-projects6 (270) are heavily affected. (endorlabs.com)
- Endor Labs reports that one victim says the attacker used a leaked GitHub CLI (gh) OAuth token on their repository. Endor Labs says how credentials were stolen has not been confirmed for the campaign as a whole. (endorlabs.com)
- BleepingComputer reports that some of the compromised accounts belonged to Fortune 100 organizations, the US General Services Administration, the French government, Nextcloud and WebdriverIO. It also says about 50 of them appear to have publishing rights on ecosystems such as npm, PyPI, Go, crates and Packagist. (bleepingcomputer.com)
- Hackread reports that OX Security counted more than 66,200 probe pull requests and malicious commits in 8,093 public repositories, with more than 4,100 probes opened on November 12. (hackread.com)
Update, 18 November 2026
- GitGuardian says GitHub held the workflow-file forms of the payload (every November run it could still observe was in action_required and never started), but the npm hook form changes no workflow file, so the repository’s own unchanged workflows ran it during npm install, bypassing the hold. (blog.gitguardian.com)
- CSO Online reports that Fly.io confirmed its GitHub App tokens leaked because its deploy process left them in .git/config files inside build directories that some apps served publicly, and that Fly.io itself was not breached. (csoonline.com)
- CSO Online reports that GitHub’s bulk revocation of the Fly.io app tokens stopped partway, so some of the stolen token pool may still be valid. (csoonline.com)
- GitGuardian says a precursor phase ran from Oct. 24 to 29, 2026 (80 payload patches, 7 accounts, 12 repositories) before the mass wave began on Nov. 10. (blog.gitguardian.com)
Sources
- Aikido: wfx-loot campaign pushes CI secret stealer to tens of thousands of repositories
- The Hacker News: Attacker Used 4,837 Hijacked GitHub Accounts to Run a CI Secret Stealer in 1,806+ Repositories
- SafeDep: wfx: GitHub Actions Credential Stealer Hits 8,000 Repos
- Help Net Security: Check your GitHub repos: A secret stealer hit tens of thousands of them
- StepSecurity: WFX Phantom: The GitHub Actions Secret Stealer That Deletes Its Tracks
- SecurityWeek: Attacker Targets 60,000 GitHub Repositories in Credential Theft Campaign
- endorlabs.com: Hijacked GitHub Accounts Push “wfx” CI Secret Stealer to Thousands of Repositories | Endor Labs
- bleepingcomputer.com: Hackers compromise 4,800 GitHub accounts to steal cloud credentials
- hackread.com: Hackers Use 4,837 Stolen GitHub Accounts to Target 61,764 Repositories
- blog.gitguardian.com: wfx-loot: A CI Secret Stealer Pushed With Stolen GitHub Credentials
- csoonline.com: Thousands of GitHub repos hit with secret-stealing malware