HighBreach / campaignMonitoring

Falcon C2 framework hijacks browsers at government agencies

Unit 42 reports Falcon, a browser-based C2 framework used against government sites; audit browser extensions and injected scripts in webmail portals.

Published
Updated
Exploitation
Yes, Unit 42 observed government entities in one Middle Eastern and four Southeast Asian countries compromised between March and May 2026

What happened

Unit 42 identified Falcon (also called XG or Xiàng Gē), a command and control (C2) framework that compromises victims’ browsers by running malicious JavaScript. An actor used it against visitors of webmail portals and government web applications by placing malicious JavaScript directly within those sites, according to Unit 42. How the sites themselves were first compromised is not confirmed in the sources.

Scope. Unit 42 reports compromises of government entities in one Middle Eastern country and four Southeast Asian countries between March and May 2026. Targets included ministries of foreign affairs, defense and interior, and law enforcement agencies, which Unit 42 describes as consistent with strategic intelligence collection. The countries are not named in the sources, and the actor is not named or attributed.

What it steals. Operating inside the browser context, attackers used the framework to sideload malicious Chrome extensions and steal passwords, emails, session cookies and communications (Unit 42). GBHackers adds that this gives authenticated access to government applications without immediately needing a conventional endpoint implant.

How the framework works (per Unit 42):

  • Falcon is written in NodeJS. The management panel listens on TCP port 8080 and the victim-facing listener on TCP port 443.
  • The panel shows a blank page with right-click disabled, and the login form appears only after F9 is pressed three times. The victim-facing page serves a JavaScript Tetris or Snake game as camouflage.
  • Each browser session gets a uniquely obfuscated implant. It keeps a TLS WebSocket connection open while the affected tab stays open and sends a heartbeat every minute.
  • Data is encrypted with AES-256-CBC after a key exchange using a 2048-bit RSA public key. There is a Comet fallback in which payload data is not encrypted, and a weaker encoding fallback if the Web Crypto API is unavailable.
  • Operators can run arbitrary JavaScript through eval. The implant stores a persistent session ID in local storage and in a cookie, both using the Hm_lvt_ prefix, with a cookie expiry in the year 2099.

Link to PeckBirdy. Unit 42 notes that Trend Micro reported a framework called PeckBirdy in January 2026. Based on near-identical URL structures, delivery mechanisms, protocols and the same Hm_lvt_ naming, Unit 42 assesses with high confidence that Falcon and PeckBirdy are variants of the same core framework.

Browser extensions. Falcon has one extension for Chrome and one for Firefox. Unit 42 states it does not know how operators deploy them and suspects an initial implant tricks targets into installing one. GBHackers reports that the Chrome package masquerades as “PDF Viewer” and that its Manifest V3 configuration requests 40 permissions, including access to all websites. It also reports that the extensions collect credentials, cookies, history and downloads, can proxy requests through the victim’s browser using existing sessions, and can collect Gmail, Discord, Zalo and X communications.

Antino implant. Falcon also delivered an implant Unit 42 calls Antino, which uses Microsoft OneDrive as a C2 channel. GBHackers reports that at a Southeast Asian police entity, operators harvested usernames and then showed selected users fake Adobe Flash Player update prompts that delivered Antino. It describes Antino as a Rust implant with Registry Run persistence through sdiagnhost.exe and ten commands covering shell, PowerShell, file operations and Rhai scripts. The two outlets are consistent on the core facts. The extra detail in this section comes from GBHackers’ summary and was not visible in the portion of the Unit 42 article provided.

Am I affected?

The sources do not describe any vulnerability, CVE or patch. The activity is a malicious-script campaign, so exposure depends on what your users visit and which browsers they run.

  • You may be affected if your organization is a government entity in the regions Unit 42 describes, or if your staff use webmail portals or government web applications that could have had scripts injected. The sources do not list which specific sites were affected.
  • You may be affected if managed browsers contain unexpected extensions, especially ones loaded in developer mode or requesting broad permissions.
  • Unit 42 says Palo Alto Networks customers are better protected through Advanced WildFire, Advanced URL Filtering, Advanced DNS Security, Cortex XDR and XSIAM, Cortex Agentic Endpoint Security and Prisma Browser. That is the vendor’s own statement and is not independently verified.

GBHackers lists indicators including these defanged domains and one Chrome extension ID in its IOC table. The full list of file hashes is in the GBHackers article.

  • Falcon C2 domains: fonts.tarotfree101[.]top, fonts.chrorne[.]com, robot.avbliud[.]com
  • Payload delivery domains: microsoft-flash[.]com, wps-cn[.]com
  • Chrome extension ID: mbidcmlcbgbphpoacojjbmfpohcimjji

What to do now

  1. Review installed browser extensions on managed devices. GBHackers advises investigating unauthorized developer-mode extensions and extensions with excessive permissions. The Chrome extension ID listed above can serve as a reference during that review, though GBHackers lists it only as an indicator and does not give this advice itself.
  2. Inspect webmail portals and internal web applications you operate for injected script tags that you did not add (GBHackers).
  3. Look for unexpected Hm_lvt_ entries in browser local storage and cookies, which Unit 42 identifies as Falcon’s session identifier artifacts.
  4. Check DNS and proxy logs for the domains listed above. Per GBHackers, also correlate browser WebSocket activity with authentication to foreign OneDrive tenants and with writes to antino/ directories.
  5. If you find signs of compromise, treat passwords and session cookies handled in the affected browsers as exposed, since the sources say these are what the framework steals. Unit 42 invites suspected victims to contact its Incident Response team.

Further technical detail on the extensions and Antino is in the full Unit 42 report.

Sources