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GBHackers reports Evooo1Bot uses cron to persist on edge devices

GBHackers reports Linux botnet Evooo1Bot uses a five-minute cron job to persist on edge devices; audit scheduled jobs before cleanup.

Published
Exploitation
Yes, per GBHackers, which says FortiGuard Labs observed exploitation attempts against edge devices; affected models and the entry point are not confirmed

What happened

According to GBHackers, a Linux botnet called Evooo1Bot targets internet-facing edge devices and can reinstall itself within five minutes if responders delete the malware but leave its scheduled job in place. GBHackers says FortiGuard Labs disclosed Evooo1Bot on August 13, 2026, after observing exploitation attempts against edge devices. This advisory rests on that one outlet; we have not seen the FortiGuard Labs publication itself.

GBHackers reports that Evooo1Bot reuses Mirai’s distributed denial-of-service engine and adds encrypted command-and-control and a SOCKS relay. Its persistence routine reportedly creates a cron job that fetches and runs a remote script every five minutes. GBHackers also says the bot can turn a compromised appliance into a proxy, so operators could route traffic through it or reach internal networks.

GBHackers also cites a Flare analysis from February 9 (the year is not given in the article) of a different bot, SSHStalker, captured by an SSH honeypot. According to that summary, its cron job runs every minute, checks whether the bot process is alive, and relaunches it with a local script if not. GBHackers notes that blocking a download server does not stop a local watchdog like this.

What is not confirmed: GBHackers says neither report establishes that the campaigns compromised specific switch models. The initial access method is not stated, and GBHackers describes cron as the persistence mechanism, not the vulnerability that gets attackers onto the device. No CVE is named in the source. GBHackers adds a firewall precedent: it says MITRE ATT&CK’s T1053.003 entry cites Operation MidnightEclipse, where attackers used cron to fetch payloads after compromising Palo Alto Networks firewalls.

Am I affected?

The source does not name affected products, models or firmware versions, so this is not confirmed for any specific device. Per GBHackers, the exposure it describes is internet-facing, Linux-based firewalls and switches, where reviewing the vendor configuration does not show whether the underlying operating system runs unauthorized jobs.

GBHackers says a job that runs every minute is not proof of compromise, and a download command alone does not identify Evooo1Bot access. Compare any suspicious job against a known-good baseline for the same model and firmware.

What to do now

The steps below follow the guidance GBHackers reports.

  1. Use a vendor-supported method to export system crontabs, per-user crontabs and scheduled scripts where available. Review vendor-native schedulers and event handlers separately, because a clean Linux crontab does not clear them.
  2. Record what you inspected on each appliance. Mark devices without supported shell access or equivalent telemetry as uninspected, not clean.
  3. Prioritize jobs that download and immediately execute code, call scripts from temporary or memory-backed directories, or appeared after an unexplained administrative login.
  4. Compare jobs with a known-good baseline for the same model and firmware, then correlate changes with centralized authentication logs and outbound connection records.
  5. If a malicious job is confirmed, isolate the appliance as far as operations allow, and preserve the schedule, referenced scripts, file metadata and relevant logs.
  6. Turn off the job before terminating the process so the scheduler cannot restart it. GBHackers says Evooo1Bot also installs a systemd service labeled “Apache HTTPD Cache Manager”, an init script, an rc.local entry and a login script, so removing the crontab entry alone leaves those paths intact.
  7. Before returning the device to service, close the initial access path and verify that neither the job nor unexpected outbound traffic returns. Where telemetry is missing, baseline scheduled jobs and monitor appliance egress instead of treating a quiet dashboard as proof of a clean device.

Sources