HighVulnerabilityPatch available

Gitea: Escape reports public-only token reaches admin API (CVE-2026-117635)

Escape and Gitea’s advisory report a public-only token from a site-admin account can reach the admin API; upgrade Gitea to 28.3.0 or later.

Published
Fixed in
Gitea 28.3.0
Exploitation
No evidence in the sources. Both describe reproduction by the reporters only; in-the-wild exploitation is not confirmed.

Live scores

CVE-2026-117635
EPSS
0.003
low predicted chance of attack
VEDAS
0.049
little exploit evidence
On CISA KEV
Not listed
Detection rule
No public rule yet

What happened

According to Escape’s research blog, a Gitea access token restricted to “public only” could still reach the whole admin API, up to creating a new site administrator. Gitea’s own GitHub security advisory describes the same defect and assigns it CVE-2026-117635, rated High at 8.1 (GitHub Security Advisories: GHSA-37xv-m4w7-j2fh). Escape says it found the issue and reported it through Gitea’s private advisory process (Escape).

The advisory says a public-only token is refused on /api/v1/orgs/{private-org} but returns the same organization on /api/v1/admin/orgs. It says the restriction is dropped on the whole admin API. According to the advisory, the token can list every user’s email, create private organizations, mint a runner registration token and create a new site admin account. The advisory adds that revoking the token does not remove that account.

On the cause, the advisory says tokenRequiresScopes() only sets a flag, and enforcement happens per route through checkTokenPublicOnly() or rejectPublicOnly(). It says the admin route group attaches neither. Escape’s write-up says the same defect had been closed for other route groups earlier: the /api/v1/user routes (GitHub Security Advisories: GHSA-wrr5-99h5-gq57) and the organization and team routes (GHSA-fq2p-5p22-8g6j, GHSA-h56g-4qw7-2mxg).

Escape reports this timeline:

  • Reported on 2026-08-02.
  • Accepted by the maintainers on 2026-10-12.
  • Closed by PR #39690 on 2026-10-19.
  • Released in v28.3.0 on 2026-11-01.

The GitHub advisory credits a second reporter and a remediation developer.

Not confirmed: any exploitation in the wild. The sources describe reproduction by the reporters only, and the advisory reporter says they reproduced it by hand on a local instance.

Am I affected?

According to the GitHub advisory, affected versions are 28.2.0 and earlier, and the patched version is 28.3.0.

Both sources say the token must have been issued by a site-admin account. Escape describes the case as a public-only token carrying write:admin. The advisory reporter says they checked that a normal user’s token with write:admin, and with all, gets 403 on every admin route. Whether other scope combinations behave differently is not confirmed in the sources.

What to do now

  1. Upgrade Gitea to v28.3.0 or later (Escape and the advisory both name this as the fix).
  2. Review your site-admin accounts and remove any you do not recognise. Escape notes that revoking a token does not remove accounts it created.
  3. Review Actions runners and runner registration tokens for any you did not set up.
  4. List public-only tokens issued from site-admin accounts. Escape suggests rotating any that were stored where they could leak, such as CI variables or build logs.
  5. If you keep access logs, look for /api/v1/admin requests made with tokens that were meant to be public-only, as Escape suggests.

Sources