Gitea: Escape reports public-only token reaches admin API (CVE-2026-117635)
Escape and Gitea’s advisory report a public-only token from a site-admin account can reach the admin API; upgrade Gitea to 28.3.0 or later.
- Published
- Ecosystem
- Open sourceCI/CD
- Fixed in
- Gitea 28.3.0
- Exploitation
- No evidence in the sources. Both describe reproduction by the reporters only; in-the-wild exploitation is not confirmed.
Live scores
CVE-2026-117635- EPSS
- 0.003
low predicted chance of attack - VEDAS
- 0.049
little exploit evidence - On CISA KEV
- Not listed
- Detection rule
- No public rule yet
What happened
According to Escape’s research blog, a Gitea access token restricted to “public only” could still reach the whole admin API, up to creating a new site administrator. Gitea’s own GitHub security advisory describes the same defect and assigns it CVE-2026-117635, rated High at 8.1 (GitHub Security Advisories: GHSA-37xv-m4w7-j2fh). Escape says it found the issue and reported it through Gitea’s private advisory process (Escape).
The advisory says a public-only token is refused on /api/v1/orgs/{private-org} but returns the same organization on /api/v1/admin/orgs. It says the restriction is dropped on the whole admin API. According to the advisory, the token can list every user’s email, create private organizations, mint a runner registration token and create a new site admin account. The advisory adds that revoking the token does not remove that account.
On the cause, the advisory says tokenRequiresScopes() only sets a flag, and enforcement happens per route through checkTokenPublicOnly() or rejectPublicOnly(). It says the admin route group attaches neither. Escape’s write-up says the same defect had been closed for other route groups earlier: the /api/v1/user routes (GitHub Security Advisories: GHSA-wrr5-99h5-gq57) and the organization and team routes (GHSA-fq2p-5p22-8g6j, GHSA-h56g-4qw7-2mxg).
Escape reports this timeline:
- Reported on 2026-08-02.
- Accepted by the maintainers on 2026-10-12.
- Closed by PR #39690 on 2026-10-19.
- Released in v28.3.0 on 2026-11-01.
The GitHub advisory credits a second reporter and a remediation developer.
Not confirmed: any exploitation in the wild. The sources describe reproduction by the reporters only, and the advisory reporter says they reproduced it by hand on a local instance.
Am I affected?
According to the GitHub advisory, affected versions are 28.2.0 and earlier, and the patched version is 28.3.0.
Both sources say the token must have been issued by a site-admin account. Escape describes the case as a public-only token carrying write:admin. The advisory reporter says they checked that a normal user’s token with write:admin, and with all, gets 403 on every admin route. Whether other scope combinations behave differently is not confirmed in the sources.
What to do now
- Upgrade Gitea to v28.3.0 or later (Escape and the advisory both name this as the fix).
- Review your site-admin accounts and remove any you do not recognise. Escape notes that revoking a token does not remove accounts it created.
- Review Actions runners and runner registration tokens for any you did not set up.
- List public-only tokens issued from site-admin accounts. Escape suggests rotating any that were stored where they could leak, such as CI variables or build logs.
- If you keep access logs, look for
/api/v1/adminrequests made with tokens that were meant to be public-only, as Escape suggests.
Sources
- Escape: Escape research found a scope bypass that made Gitea’s restricted tokens full admins. It’s now CVE-2026-117635.
- GitHub Security Advisories: Public-only tokens bypass private-resource restrictions on the admin API
- GitHub Security Advisories: Public-only tokens bypass private-resource restrictions on /api/v1/user self routes
- GitHub Security Advisories: Public-Only Personal access tokens scope bypass in Organization and Permission Endpoints
- GitHub Security Advisories: Public-only API token restriction is not enforced on team API routes