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StepSecurity reports malicious WPPConnect npm releases steal secrets

StepSecurity reports two WPPConnect npm releases and Docker images upload secrets and WhatsApp sessions; check versions and rotate secrets.

Published
Exploitation
Not independently confirmed. StepSecurity reports the published code uploads data to a Telegram bot, but says it read the payload as text without running it, and the number of affected systems is not confirmed.

What happened

According to StepSecurity, which is the only source for this story, two npm releases of the WPPConnect WhatsApp libraries carried a “diagnostics” module that uploads environment variables, .env files and WhatsApp session tokens to a Telegram bot. StepSecurity says npm began serving @wppconnect-team/wppconnect 2.4.1 at 23:31 UTC on November 15, 2026, and @wppconnect/server 2.10.82 at 03:09 UTC on November 16. StepSecurity These findings have not been independently verified, and no statement from the WPPConnect maintainers appears in the source.

StepSecurity reports the following details:

  • Delivery path: The library release was published by a GitHub Actions trusted publisher and carries valid SLSA provenance, yet StepSecurity says the commit behind it had no review. The server release has the same trusted-publisher identity but no attestation. StepSecurity
  • Other channels: StepSecurity says the project’s Docker and nightly-release workflows also built from the payload commits, so Docker images of wppconnect/wppconnect-server and the GitHub nightly release carried the same code. StepSecurity
  • Trigger: StepSecurity says the code runs when the library is loaded or the server starts, not at install, so npm install --ignore-scripts does not stop it. StepSecurity
  • Collected data: StepSecurity says the module gathers host details and public IP, environment variables, the first 12,000 characters of files such as .env and config.json, and up to five .json WhatsApp session files from ./tokens/. StepSecurity
  • Exfiltration: According to StepSecurity, the report is sent through the Telegram Bot API sendDocument method, at most once per day per host, with errors swallowed. StepSecurity
  • Evasion: StepSecurity says the server variant waits 30 to 240 seconds and does nothing on hosts that look like CI runners or sandboxes. It says the library variant has no such checks, so a CI job importing it would have sent its job environment. StepSecurity
  • History rewrite: StepSecurity says both default branches were force-pushed about 30 seconds after an external researcher opened public issues, and the v2.4.1 tag now points to a look-alike commit without the payload. StepSecurity

StepSecurity says every step was done through the joaosouz4dev GitHub account, but notes that GitHub shows which account acted, not who operated it.

Am I affected?

StepSecurity says you may be affected if any of these apply: StepSecurity

  • Your lockfiles or node_modules contain @wppconnect-team/wppconnect 2.4.1 or 2.4.3, or @wppconnect/server 2.10.82 or 2.10.83.
  • You ran a Docker image tagged 2.10.82 or 2.10.83.
  • You pulled any wppconnect/wppconnect-server image between 02:48 and 03:54 UTC on November 16, or the main tag before 07:31 UTC.
  • A fresh @wppconnect/server install happened while library 2.4.1 was latest. StepSecurity says the server depends on the library at ^2.3.6 and pulled in the bad version.

StepSecurity says npm recorded 155 downloads of 2.4.1, but that is a floor because the window covers only about 28 minutes. It does not count affected systems.

Not confirmed:

  • How access to the account was obtained, per StepSecurity.
  • Why npm does not list 2.4.3 and 2.10.83, although StepSecurity says its Actions log shows the pipeline ran for them.
  • Whether the main Docker tag held an infected image before 07:31 UTC.
  • Whether the replacement Docker images are clean; StepSecurity says it did not verify this.
  • Whether any data was actually received by the Telegram bot.

What to do now

  1. Search lockfiles and node_modules for @wppconnect-team/wppconnect 2.4.1 and 2.4.3, and @wppconnect/server 2.10.82 and 2.10.83. StepSecurity also suggests checking 2.4.2 as a precaution. StepSecurity
  2. Compare Docker image digests, not tags, because StepSecurity says floating tags were repointed. StepSecurity
  3. If anything loaded an affected version or ran an affected image, treat every secret reachable from that process as stolen, as StepSecurity advises, and sign out the WhatsApp sessions. StepSecurity
  4. Check CI jobs that import the library, since StepSecurity says the library variant does not skip CI environments.
  5. Do not rely on the absence of the marker file (.wpp-support-diag or .wpp-diag) to clear a host; StepSecurity says it only shows the payload started.
  6. When reviewing the release workflow, StepSecurity points to the version of publish.yml at commit dee571e, not the current one on master.
  7. Watch for an official statement from the WPPConnect maintainers; none is cited in the source.

Sources