MediumEcosystem changeMonitoring

Kaspersky reports BlackNevas group destroyed ESXi and vCenter estate

Kaspersky reports a BlackNevas ransomware incident that hit ESXi and vCenter via management tools; review vCenter access and backups.

Published
Updated
Exploitation
Yes, according to Kaspersky’s incident response engagement; it says no virtualization vulnerability was exploited and legitimate VMware management interfaces were used

What happened

According to Kaspersky’s Global Emergency Response Team (GERT), it investigated an engagement in which an adversary destroyed an organization’s virtualization estate over a 10-day period. Kaspersky says the campaign targeted four ESXi hosts, every virtual machine on them, both vCenter Server Appliances, and all connected backup infrastructure. Kaspersky reports that the ransom notes identified the attacker as the BlackNevas group, first observed in November 2024. This attribution rests on the ransom notes as described by Kaspersky. No independent verification is available in the sources. Kaspersky Securelist

Kaspersky says no virtualization layer vulnerabilities were exploited, with no guest-to-host escapes and no hypervisor memory corruption. It says every action against ESXi ran through legitimate VMware management interfaces. Kaspersky Securelist

Kaspersky also gives background on why such attacks are accessible:

  • It says the Babuk ransomware source code, including its ESXi version, leaked in September 2021, and that at least ten later ransomware families have used it.
  • It says the organizations in the cases it describes run unsupported ESXi versions, which makes them easier to attack.
  • It cites its own services report: ransomware accounted for 39.4% of incidents GERT handled in 2025.

Kaspersky Securelist

Kaspersky notes that Broadcom states third-party agents and antivirus are not supported directly on ESXi and vCenter Server Appliance. It says an EDR agent inside a guest cannot directly see an ESXi-side process modifying a virtual machine disk. Defenders therefore depend on host and management-plane telemetry. Kaspersky Securelist

Not confirmed: the victim’s name, the sector, the initial access method, and any ransom or data figures. The source text available to us is truncated, and the article’s table of contents lists further sections (credential reuse from the Windows estate, backup infrastructure as a credential bridge, indicators of compromise) whose details we could not read. Kaspersky Securelist

Am I affected?

The article is not a patch advisory. No CVE or fixed version is named in the text available to us, so there is no version check to run.

The report is most relevant if you operate ESXi hosts or vCenter, especially if:

  • you run ESXi versions that are no longer supported, which Kaspersky says it saw in the cases it describes;
  • your backup systems are reachable with credentials from the same environment as your virtual machines.

Whether any specific environment is affected is not confirmed by the source.

What to do now

The steps below follow topics the article’s table of contents lists under hardening and detection. We could not read the full guidance, so check the original article for specifics. Kaspersky Securelist

  1. Read the full Kaspersky article, including its indicators of compromise and its minimum forensic collection set.
  2. Review who can administer vCenter and ESXi, and whether those identities are separate from ordinary enterprise administration. The article lists “Treat vCenter as Tier 0” and separating virtualization identities as hardening topics.
  3. Keep direct ESXi management paths narrow, another topic the article lists.
  4. Send logs to a destination that does not depend on the ESXi host, since Kaspersky says host-native and management-plane telemetry was central to reconstructing the timeline.
  5. Treat backup as a separate security boundary, as the article’s hardening sections suggest, because Kaspersky reports the attacker destroyed the backup infrastructure.
  6. Plan upgrades for any unsupported ESXi versions.

Update, 14 November 2026

GBHackers, reporting on the Kaspersky GERT findings, adds the following detail. We have not independently verified it.

  • Access: Initial movement used valid accounts (MITRE ATT&CK T1078). Credentials from non-virtualization systems gave access to vCenter, and the attackers extracted stored secrets from backup servers after gaining administrative execution there. How the credentials were first obtained is not confirmed. GBHackers
  • Persistence: On the disaster-recovery vCenter, the operators deployed MeshAgent and later a Ligolo-ng tunnel installed as vmware-vdma.service, which beaconed to api.cloudvflare[.]com:443. GBHackers
  • Host Profiles abuse: The adversary reportedly used the vCenter Host Profiles compliance workflow to switch TSM-SSH to running, so SSH sessions to ESXi hosts came from the trusted vCenter IP. GBHackers
  • Impact: The payload /tmp/esx64 stopped every VM on the disaster-recovery host within 23 seconds and overwrote roughly the first 2 KB of each virtual disk. The article says the backup GPT may still allow partial recovery. GBHackers
  • Indicators: The article lists the Windows service vspbind, the domain api.cloudvflare[.]com and the IPs 45.149.154[.]135, 91.92.242[.]121, 31.41.33[.]212 and 188.240.57[.]94, and calls them incident-specific. GBHackers
  • Detection: It suggests alerting on Host Profile remediation that changes TSM-SSH outside a change window, correlating vpxa.log and vobd.log, and forwarding auth.log, shell.log, vpxa.log and vobd.log to remote syslog. GBHackers

Sources