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opnF.sh reports open CSC Telecom database exposed 125M SMS messages

opnF.sh reports an open ClickHouse database at CSC Telecom exposed 125 million texts; check your own databases for open ports.

Published
Exploitation
No, opnF.sh says no one has shown that criminals read the messages; this is not independently verified

What happened

According to opnF.sh, a ClickHouse database run by the Latvian branch of CSC Telecom was left open on the internet without a password, and it held more than 125 million text messages sent to people in Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia (opnF.sh). opnF.sh says Cybernews researchers found the database on September 28, 2026. CSC Telecom has not been quoted directly in the source, and opnF.sh’s account has not been independently verified here.

Further claims from opnF.sh, which cites Cybernews and other outlets without giving their links:

  • CSC Telecom sends texts on behalf of businesses, and the database logged those messages.
  • The records ran from October 2022 to September 2026 and included full message text, phone numbers, timestamps and routing details.
  • The database updated in real time. opnF.sh says a login code or reset link could therefore have been read before its recipient saw it.
  • Senders named include Swedbank, SEB, airBaltic, ERGO, Porsche and Latvia’s 112 emergency line. opnF.sh says Swedbank-linked messages showed IBANs, transaction amounts and balances.
  • Per opnF.sh’s timeline, Cybernews reported the exposure privately on September 29, 2026, and public access was closed on October 27, 2026. Cybernews published on November 11, 2026.
  • opnF.sh says Swedbank has stopped using CSC Telecom, airBaltic is warning customers about suspicious texts, and Latvia’s CERT.LV has asked for an in-depth investigation and passed the case to law enforcement.
  • opnF.sh says CSC Telecom has stated that it fixed an access-configuration flaw and saw no signs of an attack. It attributes this to a Mallory roundup of company responses.
  • opnF.sh says no one has shown that criminals read the messages.
  • opnF.sh reports, citing Identity Week, that the leak is drawing GDPR scrutiny.

Not confirmed: who else accessed the database, how long it was open before it was found, and the exact number of affected people. Several named companies are still assessing what was exposed, according to opnF.sh.

Am I affected?

According to opnF.sh, you may be if you received texts in Latvia, Lithuania or Estonia from senders such as Swedbank, SEB, airBaltic or ERGO since late 2022. Whether your messages were in the database is not confirmed. opnF.sh advises watching for a notice from those companies.

If you run your own databases, the same misconfiguration could apply to you. opnF.sh notes that an open ClickHouse database also caused the early 2025 DeepSeek leak, and cites a count of more than 30,000 ClickHouse instances reachable from the internet.

What to do now

  1. From a machine outside your network, test your server’s public IP on ClickHouse’s default ports 8123 (HTTP) and 9000 (native protocol), for example with nc -zv -w 3 <public-ip> 8123. opnF.sh says a refused connection or timeout is the result you want, and a line ending in succeeded means the port is open to the internet (opnF.sh).
  2. Give every database account a password, including the built-in default user, and restrict it to localhost or a private network. opnF.sh shows a ClickHouse users.d configuration that sets a SHA-256 password hash and allows only 127.0.0.1 and ::1 for the default user.
  3. Give applications that connect from other servers their own users with only the access they need, and limit connections with a firewall rule or IP allowlist.
  4. Encrypt sensitive fields at rest and delete data you no longer need on a schedule. opnF.sh also suggests asking your SMS and email vendors how long they keep message contents.
  5. If you received texts from the named senders, opnF.sh advises being wary of messages that quote real account details, and calling your bank on its official number before acting on one.
  6. Where a service offers an authenticator app or a passkey, opnF.sh recommends using it instead of SMS codes.

Sources