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SilentAir telecom hackers intercept Taiwanese calls and texts via SS7

Enea says SilentAir used hacked Asian telecom equipment for SS7 and Diameter interception, mostly of Taiwan users; operators should harden signaling.

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Exploitation
Yes, Enea reports observed SS7 and Diameter interception attacks from hacked operator equipment since early 2025

What happened

Enea, a telecom and cybersecurity software firm, named the actor SilentAir in research published on November 11, and has watched it since early 2025, according to Infosecurity Magazine. Enea is highly confident that SilentAir operated at state level. The actor launched SS7 and Diameter attacks from hijacked equipment in operators across at least six Asian countries, and hit targets in a dozen more countries and territories, per the same outlet.

The Hacker News describes the interception method. SilentAir sent the target’s home network an UpdateLocation message, or its Diameter equivalent, claiming the hacked equipment now served the target’s phone. If the home network accepted it, calls and texts for that person would be diverted to the attackers. Some of these attacks worked. For some targets, 2FA codes were intercepted immediately after the diversion took effect, which points to attempts to break into other accounts. The same outlet notes the report gives no similar evidence for voice calls and does not say whether any account was taken over.

Further details reported:

  • Scale and pattern: attacks came in bursts, from one or a few subscribers to several thousand in a month, with gaps of up to several months or longer between bursts. Interception made up 18.3% of SilentAir’s observed activity, against 2.1% for a typical surveillance company in Enea’s earlier research, per The Hacker News.
  • Targets: mostly Taiwanese telcos and subscribers, and in rare cases political and government VIPs, per Risky Business News and Infosecurity Magazine. Risky Business News describes the group as having targeted a handful of individuals despite its broad access, while the monthly figures from the other two outlets run up to several thousand subscribers. The outlets differ in how they characterise the scale.
  • Silent SMS: SilentAir sent texts that do not display on the phone, largely to Taiwanese users around midnight. By day they appear to have been used to check whether a diversion had worked. The purpose of the night-time messages is not confirmed, according to The Hacker News.
  • Attribution: Enea links SilentAir to China-nexus operations with low confidence, citing the Taiwan focus, no Chinese targets, working hours matching China’s time zone and pauses over Chinese holidays (Infosecurity Magazine, The Hacker News). Risky Business News calls the group Chinese without that caveat and says it has been active for at least two years, since early 2025. The Hacker News adds that later analysis found suspicious activity even earlier than early 2025.
  • Link to Liminal Panda: Enea sees a possible but unproven connection. Risky Business News says the two groups were sometimes on the same telco networks at the same time, but only SilentAir was seen using SS7 and Diameter against subscribers, and cooperation could not be confirmed.
  • Liminal Panda and GTPDoor: Enea’s firewalls blocked GTPDoor and other Liminal Panda activity at several customer operators from early 2026. Enea saw at least five to 10 infected operators and believes the true number may be several dozen, concentrated in Asia, Africa and Latin America. It also found a new GTPDoor version that hides command traffic in GTP-U, which Enea believes is mostly a fallback (Infosecurity Magazine).
  • Status: Enea alerted operators hosting SilentAir sources and said both groups are set back for now but could return. The Hacker News notes the report does not say whether those operators have cleaned up the hacked equipment, and does not name the countries, operators or targets.

No CVE is associated with this activity in the sources, and no patch is mentioned.

Am I affected?

  • Mobile operators: the sources identify hijacked equipment inside operators in at least six Asian countries. Which operators is not confirmed, because the report names none. Operators that exchange signaling over the IPX are the ones Enea’s recommendations address.
  • Subscribers: most targets were Taiwanese subscribers. Targets outside Taiwan were mostly on other Southeast and East Asian networks, and at times in East Africa, Central Asia, the Middle East and Europe. People on the hacked operators’ own networks may also have been targeted, but Enea could not see that traffic (The Hacker News).
  • Ordinary users: the sources do not say how an individual can tell whether they were targeted, and The Hacker News notes the report gives no advice for people whose calls and texts may be targeted.

What to do now

  1. Operators: deploy GTP-C and GTP-U firewalls and configure them to share information with SS7 and Diameter firewalls (Enea recommendation, via The Hacker News).
  2. Go beyond the industry’s basic recommendations for signaling security.
  3. Treat the whole IPX as untrusted.
  4. Add detection for signaling protocols inside your own network, since the attackers operated from equipment within operator networks.
  5. Connect signaling security with the rest of your IT security.
  6. Individuals: no subscriber guidance is given in the sources, so none is offered here as sourced. Watch for further reporting from Enea.

Update, 17 November 2026

  • Enea says its firewalls detected several hundred attempted command-and-control (C2) exchanges from GTPDoor and other Liminal Panda activity at several customer operators since early 2026. (infosecurity-magazine.com)
  • CrowdStrike linked Liminal Panda to China-nexus operations in November 2024, also with low confidence. (infosecurity-magazine.com)
  • Enea says the new GTPDoor version rides on GTP-U, which carries far heavier traffic that is less closely watched and, unlike the control side, carries over into 5G. (infosecurity-magazine.com)
  • Risky Business News reports that SilentAir planted backdoors in telco infrastructure that run malicious SS7 and Diameter commands to collect device data, track a subscriber’s location and intercept calls and SMS traffic. (news.risky.biz)
  • Risky Business News says SilentAir is the second known APT group after Russia’s HiddenArt to exploit telephony signalling protocols, and that Enea found it ran a more stable operation than HiddenArt because of the malware foothold it held in the hacked networks. (news.risky.biz)

Sources